Indonesia ATL: The Presidency of Try Sutrisno (1997-)

[GSD310]

Canada:
Prime Minister Jean Chretien entered his seventh year in office in 2000. Remaining a steadfast supporter of good relations with Indonesia, Chretien was preparing a Team Canada visit to Indonesia later in the year. This plan however would have to be scuttled because Chretien would not be prime minister by the end of the year. Though his government had performed well in the 7 years that it was in power, the polls were beginning to show that Chretien’s popularity was on the decline and Mrs. Chretien was quietly urging him to step aside.

Waiting in the wings was Minister of Finance Paul Martin, who was itching for his chance. Fatefully for him, Martin managed to discipline his supporters and dissuaded them from meeting on the eve of the Liberal Party Conference in March 2000 out of fear that it would look unseemly. For it was at this conference that Chretien announced that he will be stepping aisde. In September 2000, Martin officially became the Leader of the Liberal Party and in October 2000, he became the prime minister succeeding Chretien.

With an eye to gaining a mandate for himself and seeing an economic slowdown in the United States which would have an effect around the world having arrived, Prime Minister Paul Martin called an election scheduled for February 2001. On polling day, Martin and the Liberals stormed to a victory with a slight increase in majority. The Canadian Alliance which constituted the opposition, led by Stockwell Day, gained votes though this barely made a dent in the Liberals’ majority.

Though originating from the same party, Martin was to the right of Chretien on the political spectrum. On the international stage, he was quick, together with Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Tony Blair and Prime Minister of Australia Peter Costello, to join President of the United States John McCain in the War on Terror; the four being seen as a quartet of western democracies standing up to the evils of Islamic radicalism.

At the same time Martin is also a strong supporter of the IMF and of the stricter enforcement of IMF conditionalities citing the likes of Russia, Brazil, Argentina and Indonesia as countries that “got off light” because it got some leniency during the financial crises of 1998-1999. Perhaps it was the former minister of finance in him.

United States:
On 20th January 2001, at midday, the McCain Administration got underway. Its first task domestically was to contend with an economic slowdown which turned into a recession in 2001. In June 2001, Congress passed McCain’s Tax Cuts into law. As promised during his campaign, McCain’s tax cuts were targeted to low- and middle-income earners while also continuing to retain the budget surplus inherited from Clinton to be used for Social Security and Medicare. The more conservative Republicans in the Congress wished the tax cuts went further than that but then again they nominated McCain for his foreign policy rather than domestic policy stance.

And that was what McCain did, setting his sights on a Russia keen on asserting itself. His first act as president was to withdraw from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. McCain then began to cast his eye in Iraq’s direction, a country that was both on his list of rogue states to be rolled back and considered to be an ally by President of Russia Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov asked him defiantly whether the United States and its allies planned to move against Iraq without the United Nation’s security authorization the way it did against Kosovo but McCain was convinced that he had Primakov’s number and that the latter would not do anything if the United States moved against Iraq.

To a lesser extent, McCain also focused on China. In strategy meetings, McCain wondered how long Russia and China’s honeymoon was going to last arguing that was what happened “last time around” during the Cold War with the Sino-Soviet Split and whether China was going to “take orders from Moscow when it, rather than Russia, is the one due to be the second largest economy in the world before the decade was out”. For the moment, however, McCain stuck to his campaign promises as a candidate: to maintain trade relations with China while watching warily at its moves on the world stage and to not stand in its way as it is admitted into the WTO.

But McCain’s focus on Russia meant that his attention, at least in retrospect, was somewhere other than where it should have been. Something that became apparent on the morning of 11th September 2001.

Airplanes commandeered by Al Qaeda terrorists were crashed into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in Washington DC, and the Sears Tower in Chicago. Amidst the smoking rubble, building wreckages and the lost lives, McCain led a nation unified in grief and anger behind him and his popularity reached levels unheard of as he declared a War On Terror. In an Address to a Joint Session of Congress, McCain called on Afghanistan’s Taliban Government to hand over Osama Bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders to the United States. When the Taliban rejected this, the United States and its allies launched Operation Enduring Freedom, invaded Afghanistan, and removed the Taliban all the while hunting for Osama Bin Laden and its allies.

Though the outpouring of sympathy had been near-unanimous in the immediate days after the attacks, it did not last very long outside of countries and parts of the world considered to be the United States’ traditional allies. Primakov too had expressed his grief and sympathy for the victims as well as condemnation of the attackers when the attacks had occurred. By the time the United States and its allies were preparing to attack Afghanistan, he was striking a different tune; telling the nations of the world that they should not feel “pressured or obliged to present themselves as agreeing unconditionally with all of the actions taken by the United States”. To McCain’s chagrin, Primakov’s encouragement for other nations not to feel pressured or obliged struck a chord.

McCain himself came to learn not to take expressions of grief, sympathy, and condemnations at face value. Grief and sympathy did not mean approval of the actions the United States was taking for the sake of its national security. Condemnations at times sounded like routine lip service to conceal the fact that behind closed doors, the nations were not unhappy to see the attacks happen and the United States “humbled”.

McCain however, counted his blessings. Russia’s attempt to present itself as being “reasonable” when compared to the bellicose United States, reminded McCain that the United States’ real enemy remained Russia. At the 2002 State of the Union Address McCain said that in addition to “Fighting the War on Terror, the other great national security challenge of this Administration will be to prevent the advance of nations seeking to challenge the United States under the guise of multipolarism”. Though he did not name names, it was generally agreed that McCain had Russia and China in mind.

The speech was not well-received internationally for sounding like McCain was “picking a fight” with those he perceived to be the United States’ challengers and marked, as historians were wont to say, the end of McCain’s “Post-9/11 Honeymoon with the world”.

The twin national security challenges of the Administration having been defined by the President, the officials within it began working towards addressing these challenges. One of these officials was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Paul Wolfowitz. In April 2002, Wolfowitz wrote a memo entitled “Indonesia Vital To Addressing National Security Challenges Outlined by President McCain”.

The thesis of the memo was in the title though this was further expounded in the memo’s content. As far as the War on Terror went, Indonesia’s value lay in the fact that it was the world’s largest Muslim country and that it would be difficult for the War on Terror to be characterized as anti-Islamic if Indonesia was on board. Pointing to the killings, arrests, trials, and convictions of known radicals, Wolfowitz argued that the fact that Indonesia is taking concrete steps against what it perceives as the Extreme Right is of even greater value in the War on Terror.

“Other nations in the Islamic world who would otherwise be content with labeling themselves “moderate” and then coast along doing nothing now feel more pressure to do something about radicals in the country”.

On the issue of nations seeking to challenge the United States’ primacy, the memo argued that Indonesia’s value lay in the stance it was taking towards China. Wolfowitz said that whilst Primakov has been positioning Russia as the leader in its relationship with China. But eventually, with its growing economic and military power, it will be China that will be decisive and which will assert itself in their relationship.

“By taking its current stance towards China, Indonesia is inadvertently pushing China to reveal its cards on the table at a timing that is earlier and at a lower level of progress than it had originally anticipated. Whether China will truly commit to a ‘peaceful rise’ will be revealed in how it reacts to Indonesia’s challenge. They, are in other words, doing us a favor."

The memo was read by Secretary of State Richard Williamson, forwarded to the White House, circulated to other departments and then became the agenda for a National Security Council meeting.

Williamson endorsed the arguments of the memo. Secretary of Defense Tom Ridge also agreed with the arguments made by the memo, adding that perhaps the United States can direct some military aid Indonesia’s way to assist it in its effort to root out terrorism and strengthen itself militarily so that it can stand up to China.

Secretary of the Treasury Phil Gramm struck a different note. Though he did not disagree with the arguments of the memo, Gramm said the United States Government has already been generous enough to Indonesia by allowing it a 10-year moratorium on debt repayments. Vice President George W. Bush sided with Gramm saying that whilst it was true that Indonesia could help serve American interests, he wondered whether they will make Indonesia too strong. Pointing to the way the Indonesian Government doggedly went after Freeport to divest its shares, Bush wondered whether Indonesia could be a “pain in the ass” if it was allowed to grow even more powerful.

McCain’s gut told him that Indonesia could be a big help. Amidst the popular sentiment after 9/11 that the United States should be able to differentiate between “radical” and “moderate” Muslims, McCain found it refreshing when Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno said that he did not want to be considered to be a moderate because it implied that he was on the same spectrum as those who had launched the attack on 9/11. But Bush and Gramm had a point about potentially making Indonesia too strong and the United States already being too generous to Indonesia.

The meeting ended with McCain saying he will ask for a second opinion from Prime Minister of Japan Taro Aso when he arrived in Washington in May.

Mexico:
Within the annals of Indonesia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, the story of the Indonesian Trade Promotion Center (IPTC) in Mexico City was the story of when they knew Indonesia was going to be fine during the Asian Financial Crisis. Only set up in 1992, the Mexico City IPTC was placed on the chopping block when the arrival of the Asian Financial Crisis necessitated budget cuts. The Department of Foreign Affairs made the argument that Mexico was the second oldest diplomatic relationship Indonesia had in Latin America. There was a stay of execution in 1998 and then in 1999, the new Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita said that the IPTC in Mexico City was no longer in danger.

In April 2000, after attending the G-77 Summit in Cuba, Vice President of Indonesia JB Sumarlin visited Mexico where he met with President Ernesto Zedillo. Among other agreements, it was announced that Mexican cement company Cemex will engage in a joint venture to construct a cement factory in Indonesia. Sumarlin and Zedillo also agreed that there will be a Bilateral Consultation Forum between Indonesia and Mexico to forge closer ties in various areas.

2000 was an election year in Mexico. Zedillo, being subject to a term limit, was not allowed to run for re-election and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to which he belonged, nominated Secretary of the Interior Francisco Labatisda. The National Action Party (PAN) nominated former Governor of Guajanato Vicente Fox. The election was held in July 2000 with Fox emerging the winner, becoming the first Mexican president since 1929 not to originate from the PRI. Zedillo, having initiated electoral reforms that placed the conduct of the election in the hands of an electoral agency rather than the secretary of the interior, now won plaudits and acclaim for conceding the election results.

Thus Fox took office in December 2000. Fox was keen to have closer relations with the United States though McCain was more interested in Russia. With Bush, Fox had more luck. The week prior to 9/11, Bush visited Mexico and he, together with Fox discussed various issues including immigration matters; issues with which Bush was familiar with when he was Governor of Texas.

Fox found out first hand that literally living in the shadows of a superpower was tough. As the United States’ economy slowed down and reached recession throughout 2001, Mexico’s economy was also negatively affected considering that the main market for its exports was north across the border. After 9/11, the recession deepened and Mexico felt the impact of this two though by early 2002, Fox felt that the United States economy will recover strongly fueled by its people’s determination to carry on their lives in defiance of the terrorist attacks. Fox was only optimistic this will have a positive effect on Mexico.

---
Chretien saying that he would have resigned in 2000 and not seek a third term is in https://www.google.co.id/books/edit...tin+toronto+hotel&pg=PT50&printsec=frontcover.

McCain’s tax cuts is based on his proposed OTL plan (https://edition.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/01/11/mccain.taxes/index.html) as is his stance on China (https://www.ontheissues.org/john_mccain.htm#Free_Trade).

We won’t be hearing the last of the United States during this around the world update but just wanted to get an idea of how things look like from their end.

Fox’s departure from OTL is in his relations with VP Bush. OTL, he was developing a good relationship with Bush until 9/11 happened and Bush had other priorities http://edition.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/09/06/hadden.latin.america.9.11/index.html

On OTL Indonesia's relationship with Mexico https://www.redalyc.org/journal/927/92751348013/html/#fn15 . In OTL, the IPTC was closed down in 1998 and reopened in 2009.

 

[GSD310]

Why i think the IMF is gonna appear again...?

Watch out when we actually get to South America. Some countries may do better, some may do worst, won't tell you which is which but it will be a bumpy ride with an IMF that wants to regain its credibility by being more "strict".

 

[GSD310]

Cuba:
If one country saw the new international dynamics as a New Cold War it was Cuba. In April 2000, as Cuba hosted the G-77 Summit, President of Cuba Fidel Castro called on the nations of Asia, Africa, Latin America to make the “current international political climate count” by cooperating and uniting against globalization, neo-liberalism, and the inequality that it brings. “We either unite or establish cooperation or we die!”

In April 2001, with the final day to coincide with the 40th Anniversary of the failure of Bay of Pigs Invasion, the Communist Party of Cuba held its 6th National Party Congress. Fidel Castro was unanimously re-elected as First Secretary and ranked first in the Politburo with his brother Raul Castro ranked second. Ranked third and fourth respectively were Carlos Lage who had been acting as the economic architect throughout the 90s and Minister of Foreign Affairs Felipe Perez Roque. Both Lage and Roque are seen with favor in Moscow and Beijing.

What was meant to the placing of fresh and capable faces among the nation’s top ranks became an exercise in leadership speculation when Fidel appeared like he was about to collapse when making a speech in June 2001. Fidel would recover and issued a statement that in the event of his “permanent incapacity”, Raul Castro would be his successor in both the party and the state.

Russia’s Lourdes SIGINT Station continues to operate in Cuba.

Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama:
In the first few months of its existence, the McCain Administration sought both to strengthen its economic and diplomatic ties with nations in its Central American backyard. In May 2001, United States Trade Representative Barbara Franklin announced that the McCain Administration has opened negotiations with Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua; the aim being to agree on a Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA).

The opening of negotiations with the five Central American nations was not without its discontents. Within weeks, an unsubstantiated rumor flew around that President of the United States John McCain had placed continuing recognition of Taiwan as a condition for participation in CAFTA; the nations in Central America, even those which did not participate in CAFTA, all recognized Taiwan rather than China.

If this unsubstantiated rumor achieved anything, it was to reveal a variety of views in Central America as leaders in the region aired their views about the proposed trade agreement, about their recognition of Taiwan, and other issues relevant to them. That 2001 and 2002 would see elections being held in these countries complicated matters.

The leader closest to the United States and most cooperative with the idea of CAFTA was President of El Salvador Francisco Flores Perez who had implemented dollarization in the El Salvadorean economy. He half-jokingly said that China had nothing to worry about seeing as the current Taiwanese Government is close to the mainland anyway.

President Alfredo Portillo in Guatemala said that he will both commit to taking part in negotiations in CAFTA and continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan but said when it came to particular issues, he would like the United States to help Guatemala in its territorial dispute in Belize.

In some of the Central American countries, recognition of Taiwan shook on shaky grounds. In Costa Rica, with a presidential election on the way in 2002, Taiwan became an election issue. Abel Pacheco, running on behalf of the incumbent presidential party Social Christian Unity Party (PUSC) committed himself to maintaining relations with Taiwan. His opponent, the National Liberation Party’s (PLN)’s Rolando Araya Monge whilst committing to relations with Taiwan noted that China’s bilateral trade with Costa Rica had bypassed that of Taiwan’s in 2000 so that this needs to be taken into account. Election day was in February 2002 and saw Monge emerge victorious. After Pacheco was heard grumbling something about Taiwan “not being serious enough” about Costa Rica, Monge would go on to be sworn in as president in May 2002. Committed to CAFTA though he was, Monge repeated his claim about China in his inauguration.

Nicaragua presented its own challenges and in fact became a problem. Approaching the election in November 2001, the incumbent presidential party Constitutionalist Liberation Party (PLC) was in favor of CAFTA while the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was against it. The PLC’s presidential candidate was Vice President of Nicaragua Enrique Bolanos while the FSLN nominated former dictator and president Daniel Ortega. There were talks among the top officials in the Administration of showing open support for Bolanos but McCain, with his focus on Afghanistan and thinking that an intervention might backfire, wavered. Thus it was that Ortega, who led the polls leading up to the election, won the election and reassumed the presidency of Nicaragua in January 2002. In his inaugural address, Ortega promised that he will maintain good relations with the United States and continue pro-market policies but that Nicaragua reserved the right to withdraw from CAFTA negotiation if it felt that the agreement would not be right for it. Ortega made good on this last statement, withdrawing from CAFTA negotiations within a week of his inauguration.

In Honduras, the issue at hand was obtaining leniency from the IMF. After a hurricane in wiped out Honduras’ agricultural produce in late 1998, the Honduran government turned to the IMF for assistance with all of its conditionalities. By 2001, Honduras was falling behind on achieving privatization of the telecommunication and electricity industries set by the IMF due to resistance in in its legislature. President of Honduras Carlos Roberto Flores requested for a waiver of the fulfillment of this condition but the IMF held firm saying that aid would have to be suspended if this continued. Negotiations were suspended as Honduras held its presidential elections in November 2001. In January 2002, new President Richard Maduro took office and continued work on privatization and instituting fiscal austerity by cutting the salaries of civil servants. Only with these austerities did the IMF eased the pressure on Honduras though teachers and doctors in Honduras protested this decision.

The McCain Administration thus tried to take back control of the narrative. At the 2002 State of the Union, President of the United States John McCain himself said that CAFTA was still on the Administration’s agenda and that it was about free trade and giving Central American nations access to the American market and job creation in Central America instead of who was recognizing which nations or territorial disputes or conditionalities.

Not long after this speech, Panama’s President Mireya Moscoso, who had presided over the handover of the Panama Canal from the United States to Panama in December 1999, announced that Panama will take part in CAFTA negotiations.

President of the Dominican Republic Hipolito Mejia too announced that the Dominican Republic, though more a Carribean rather a Central American country, will follow suit in taking part in negotiations. The Dominican Republic being a strong performing economy in the final years of the 1990s.

Belize:
“If our aim is to build a presence around the world, even in the corners of the globe that we don’t ordinarily think about, then I think we should not overlook this nation. Geographically it’s in Central America but politically it’s a member of the Carribean Community. In other words, it’s strategically positioned if we want to have a presence in this part of the world and keep an eye on what’s happening in the United States’ backyard. Work to establish diplomatic relations with this country and see what areas of cooperation are possible.”- President Try Sutrisno’s handwritten scrawlings to a Department of Foreign Affairs memo about nations which does not have a diplomatic relationship with Indonesia, July 2001

Haiti:
After a parliamentary election in May and June 2000 seen to be illegitimate and a presidential election in November 2000 which was also thought to be illegitimate, Jean Bertrand Aristide takes office as President of Haiti in February 2001. The suspension of aid from the United States and Europe, the suspension of loans from international financial institutions because Haiti had fallen into arrears and two attempted coups in 2001 only made Aristide more defiant. In early 2002, Haiti began exploring the possibility of getting loans from Russia and China; the latter was especially keen to help on the condition that Haiti withdraws its diplomatic recognition of Taiwan.

Jamaica:
In February 1999, Jamaica hosted the 1999 G-15 Summit. Prime Minister PJ Patterson found Indonesia’s Try Sutrisno busy with items that are not on the summit’s agenda, jet-lagged, and having just recovered from a cold he caught during his flight to Canada. Try’s only real contribution to the summit, which discussed the financial crises in Asia, Russia, and Latin America, was a speech in which he said leniency from the IMF meant implementing economic reform but not at the expense of social stability and that it was not license to do as one pleased in economic policy, saying that he still maintained fiscal discipline in Indonesia. Some two years later, it was Patterson’s turn to be jetlagged as he attended the 2001 G-15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia in May 2001.

Despite their leaders’ jet-lagged impressions of each other, Jamaica signed a deal to export alumina to Indonesia on the sidelines of the G-15 Summit. Still with some work to do to build its industrial structure and with its economy growing fast, Indonesia still needed to import alumina. For Jamaica, the usefulness of the deal would be felt when in the wake of riots in July 2001 (when Patterson had to call in the Army) and in the aftermath of 9/11 (when tourist arrivals sharply declined), the alumina exports to Indonesia helped to cushion the economic impact though the social unrest would still be there as Jamaica entered 2002. To his cabinet, Patterson said that Jamaica must take advantage of the current situation before Indonesia downstreams its resources industries.

For the moment, Patterson wanted to see more of Indonesia and expected to see Try Sutrisno at the G-15 in Caracas, Venezuela in 2002. Which was why when events happened in Venezuela, he called on the G-15 to choose another country to host the 2002 G-15 Summit.

Trinidad and Tobago:
Jamaica would not be the only one to benefit from a growing economy a world away. In June 2001, a delegation from Indonesia arrived at Port of Spain to conclude a deal to import asphalt for road constructions; the asphalt coming from the Pitch Lake, the largest natural deposit of asphalt in the world. In October 2001, just as the tourist cancellations were coming in in the aftermath at 9/11 a Chinese delegation came in to explore the possibility of buying asphalt for construction in Beijing as it prepares for the Olympic Games. Though the Chinese delegation scoffed when it heard from the Trinidian Government that Indonesia had signed a deal to import asphalt, their actions spoke louder than their scoffs: by early 2002, China had concluded its own deal with Trinidad and Tobago to import asphalt.

The economic prospects for Trinidad and Tobago, with two growing economies importing commodity from it, strengthened the hand of Prime Minister Basdeo Panday of the United National Congress (UNC). After getting re-elected on his economic performance in 2000, Panday faced challenges internally and externally. Externally from an opposition claiming that some of the UNC members in parliament had dual citizenship and internally from Attorney General Ramesh Maharaj who claimed that Panday was not doing enough about corruption. Maharaj and his followers in the UNC eased on their pressure on Panday and decided to bide their time.

Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines:
“I think in late 2001, people around the world were starting to take notice of our nation. If not because of our increasing prominence in international affairs then at least as an economic power. In my post as Indonesia’s Ambassador to the United Nations, I am also accredited to the Caribbean. By early 2002, the Caribbean were dealing with the adverse consequences of the world downturn and of 9/11. Comprising of nations that to various degrees relied on tourism, the region found itself on the receiving end of cancellations and declining numbers of visitors. Their economies slowed down and they went into deficit in a bid to stimulate the economy.

This was especially the case in the Bahamas where over 80% of the tourist arrivals were from the United States. Surprisingly, in their search for alternative tourist markets they turned to us and asked for assistance to promote Bahamas to Indonesians back home or at the very least Indonesians living in the United States. I am aware that this drove nations closer to our shores to promote their own tourism industries to attract our tourists but that is beyond the scope of this book.

From a diplomatic standpoint, I was most interested in Barbados. This is a former British colony, flirting with Republicanism who has some stature in the Caribbeans. Struggling with the downturn and 9/11, Barbados was encouraging other nations in the region to come to an agreement on free trade. Its orientation in world affairs seems to be moderate though tending to be pro-Western. Surprised that we haven’t had a diplomatic relationship with a prominent nation in the region, I wrote to the President about this and he agreed that approaches should be made to Barbados. Minister of Trade Anthony Salim met with me in early 2002 and supported me enthusiastically; always on the lookout for new markets for Indonesian products, he was interested in how Barbados’ currency was pegged to the US dollar and how this meant that the Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods he wanted to promote would be very affordable in Barbados. I told him that other nations in the region are pegged to the US dollar at different rates.

As far away as this region may seem from Indonesia, it does offer us with some relevant questions regarding our foreign policy. Much as Central America, the Caribbean is home to nations which has diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than China. In Saint Lucia, it has become something of a partisan issue. Within months of assuming office, Prime Minister Kenny Anthony cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognized China. Meanwhile, Anthony’s predecessor, Saint Lucia’s founding father and current Opposition Leader John Compton favored having a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.

Here, like in Southeast Asia, there is a sense that Beijing’s power and influence is growing while Taiwan’s is contracting. Last year in September 2000, the Government of Grenada expelled the Chinese Ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago. The latter had come to speak to an organization favoring diplomatic relations with China. What was disappointing for Prime Minister of Grenada Keith Mitchell was Taipei’s response saying that the Chinese Ambassador was well within her rights to visit Grenada.

Such response from Taipei was cause for concern for some. In late August 2001, I met with Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines Ralph Gonsalves who was transiting in New York City. Gonsalves’ foreign policy is independent-minded if left-leaning, maintaining a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan even as he is building ties with Venezuela. Gonsalves asked what is Indonesia’s stance towards Taiwan was. When I told him that Indonesia maintained a One China Policy, Gonsalves seemed incredulous and said that certainly given that we were on what he described a “collision course” with China, Taiwan would be part of our equation.

Diplomatically, I told him that what would be of concern for Indonesia right now is his visit to Libya not because Indonesia is pro-American but because Libya supported Acehnese separatists in the past.

Gonsalves laughed. At the time, he together with Prime Minister Mitchell of Grenada, Prime Minister of Dominica Pierre Charles, Prime Minister of Saint Kitts and Nevis Denzil Douglas, and Prime Minister of Antigua and Barbuda Lester Bird was about to make a trip to Libya. There, the five Caribbean nations intended to strengthen its ties with Libya; the latter promising to import bananas from all five nations. Gonsalves was satisfied that all five will be making the trip. At the last minute, Saint Kitts’ Douglas and Antigua’s Bird both began to waver but Gonsalves and Mitchell eased their concerns.”

From: Representing The Garuda In World by Juwono Sudarsono- Indonesian Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-200x)

---
OK, so we’re now over the Central Americas and Caribbeans a region where at the beginning of the century, there are a lot of nations that recognize Taiwan. As this is an Indonesian-centric TL, there's a seed being planted here: how does Taiwan feature in Indonesia's calculations ITTL given Indonesia's stance towards China.

The SIGINT station in Cuba closed down in late 2001 OTL.

The butterflies here are more subtle. OTL CAFTA was about free trade but ITTL, it’s about the US consolidating control in its “backyard”. In both Central America and the Caribbeans, the nations are more vocal. This is due to the ITTL international relations being more multipolar ie. There’s an implied threat there that if the US is too tough, smaller nations can turn to Russia and China.

On Costa Rica’s trade with China bypassing its trade with Taiwan in 2000 https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/notes-on-costa-ricas-switch-from-taipei-to-beijing/

The departure from OTL in Nicaragua is that the US doesn’t openly show its preference as it did in OTL for Ortega’s opponent https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/03/duncancampbell

On Caribbean nations’ OTL visit to Libya where St. Kitts and Antigua did not send their prime ministers http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/08/politics-caribbean-libyan-overture-echoes-with-history/

Avoiding the foreign dependencies and territories and just focusing on states.

Alrighty next, we arrive at South America proper.

 

[GSD310]

Still writing up the next update with all the interruptions that real life brings but just couldn't help writing a short prologue in the thread's original post after finding an interesting video on Youtube. It's of Soeharto holding court in February 1997 talking about Indonesia's political system including about how the VP will succeed him if he dies. For the purposes of the thread, what's most interesting is that the cameraman decides to zoom in on Try's face as Soeharto gives his lecture and you do wonder what he's thinking as Soeharto's saying all these things.

Here's that prologue that I posted in the thread's original post:

Prologue:
​

4th February 1997:
"But in unexpected circumstances, when people can't tell when they're going to get into a misadventure or pass away, there's a mechanism for that.

So if the president is permanently incapacitated, the vice president will therefore be the president to complete the remainder of the presidential term. If the remainder of the term is 2 years, then the new president's term will be 2 years.

As such, this new president who is previously the vice president and who has ascended to the office, he will now hold the mandate originally given to his predecessor because this predecessor has passed away", said President Soeharto to a Golkar Council of Patrons iftar dinner meeting with Vice President Try Sutrisno looking on.

---
What Soeharto says above is a transcript of what he says in 9:48-10:20 of the following video.

 

[Dude...]

Still writing up the next update with all the interruptions that real life brings but just couldn't help writing a short prologue in the thread's original post after finding an interesting video on Youtube. It's of Soeharto holding court in February 1997 talking about Indonesia's political system including about how the VP will succeed him if he dies. For the purposes of the thread, what's most interesting is that the cameraman decides to zoom in on Try's face as Soeharto gives his lecture and you do wonder what he's thinking as Soeharto's saying all these things.

Here's that prologue that I posted in the thread's original post:

Prologue:
​

4th February 1997:
"But in unexpected circumstances, when people can't tell when they're going to get into a misadventure or pass away, there's a mechanism for that.

So if the president is permanently incapacitated, the vice president will therefore be the president to complete the remainder of the presidential term. If the remainder of the term is 2 years, then the new president's term will be 2 years.

As such, this new president who is previously the vice president and who has ascended to the office, he will now hold the mandate originally given to his predecessor because this predecessor has passed away", said President Soeharto to the dinner meeting with Vice President Try Sutrisno looking on.

---
What Soeharto says above is a transcript of what he says in 9:48-10:20 of the following video.

That is very ironic and a foreshadowing for this TL.

 

[AnanditaXD]

Does anyone remember which chapter President Try make a speech in front of DPR and declared sago as one of the staple food (Sembako)?

 

[Pio2013]

Does anyone remember which chapter President Try make a speech in front of DPR and declared sago as one of the staple food (Sembako)?

Chapter 135

 

[GSD310]

Venezuela:
When Hugo Chavez took his oath of office in February 1999 to become President of Venezuela, many in his nation watched with bated breath to see whether he would bring his nation to ruin or not. These many, comprising of the nation’s business community, would be surprised when Chavez cut spending to keep budget deficits modest and attempting to control inflation.

Chavez’ focus domestically was political rather than economic. In 1999, two referendums were held. A referendum in April approved the formation of a Constituent Assembly and another referendum in December to approve of a new constitution which the said Constituent Assembly has formulated. In the aftermath of this constitution’s enactment, fresh elections had to be held for all of the nation’s national and regional legislatures, the gubernatorial and mayoral positions, and most importantly for the presidency itself.

The presidential election was held in July 2000. With Yevgeny Primakov’s assumption of presidency in Russia just over the horizon and a “New Cold War” with it, much currency was made out Chavez’s populist and left-wing orientation. His opponents and critics rallied around Governor of Zulia Francisco Arias. Though he had partaken in Chavez’ coup in 1992, Arias now criticized Chavez of corruption and potrayed himself as being pro-Western. On Election Day, Chavez would emerge victorious with 53% of the votes though the 45% of the votes Arias collected reminded Chavez that there were those who looked unfavorably at his rule. Chavez would be inaugurated in January 2001, his term to last for six years under the provisions of the new constitution.

Having obtained a new mandate through his re-election in 2000, Chavez moved forward with his agenda. He held another referendum, obtaining approval from the populace to subject the trade unions. He continued to expand his Plan Bolivar program. In the economic field, Chavez secured authority from the National Assembly to enact laws by decree for a year. It was November 2001, as this authority winded down that Chavez passed a series of 49 laws the most notable of which was the Hydrocarbon Law. It called for Venezuela to have a 51% stake in joint ventures with oil participations, increased royalties, while at the same time cutting the corporate tax rate of the PDVSA, Venezuela’s state-owned oil company.

On the world stage, Chavez openly expressed his enthusiasm for a multipolar world and visited Primakov within days of the latter’s inauguration as President of Russia in August 2000, agreeing to explore closer military relations. In April 2001, Chavez received the visit of President of China Jiang Zemin. In addition to declaring their relationship a strategic partnership, Chavez and Jiang inked energy-related agreements whereby Venezuela promised to supply China with upwards of 200,000 barrels of oil per month to China in exchange for Chinese investment in Venezuela’s oil fields. More concerningly, his first three years as president would see Chavez forge close relationships with Cuba, Iraq, Libya, and Iran.

Chavez had indeed become a target. Within Venezuela, the nation’s businesspeople, concentrated within the Fedecamaras had thought the 49 laws to be “radical”. The nation’s military officers were also disillusioned, upset with the fact that Chavez advocated closer relations with Cuba and supported the FARC Rebellion in Colombia. In late 2001 and early 2002, there was increasing chatter about the possibility that Chavez might be overthrown by force.

In April 2002, Chavez’ opponents thought they had found the trigger for his removal. Chavez removed the majority of the PDVSA’s Board of Directors and appointed loyalists in their stead in order to tighten his grip on the state-owned enterprise which was long seen as a state within a state. The PDVSA’s workers responded by beginning a strike, claiming that Chavez was not taking into account meritoricracy in appointing the PDVSA. The Fedecamaras backed this strike which became a general strike when the Confederacion de Trabajadores de Venezuela (CTV) took part in the anti-Chavez movement.

Though Caracas was heating up, all eyes turned to Washington to see how it would react to developments. Secretary of State Richard Williamson said that this was a Venezuelan internal affair. Behind closed doors however, mindful that the United States imported oil from Venezuela, President of the United States John McCain gave tacit approval to what was about to happen and that whatever happens after Chavez was overthrown, things need to proceed “constitutionally and democratically”.

After anti-Chavez protesters clashed with Chavez supporters and security forces, Chavez ordered the military to prepare for a crackdown on the anti-Chavez supporters. What followed over the next few hours were officers from the various branches from Armed Forces began publicly declaring that they would not execute Chavez’ orders and that they were withdrawing support from him. By the early hours of the morning the next day, General-In-Chief of the Armed Forces of Venezuela Lucas Rincon announced that the military had asked Chavez for his resignation and Chavez had given it. Following the “Peru precedent”, Chavez was asked to nominate where he would like to go. Chavez nominated Cuba but when he was told to pick another place, he chose Libya. The Libyan Embassy was contacted and soon Chavez was told that he would be welcome there.

In the panic, Vice President Diosdado Cabello followed Chavez’ example, he sought asylum in Cuba and left before the sun had risen. In the power vacuum, Rincon and the military supported former President of the Fedecamaras and businessman Pedro Carmona as interim president and former Chavez Minister of the Interior Luis Miquilena. The three governed as a triumvirate.

Within hours of their swearing in and first meeting, the three issued a decree covering various aspects of political life which among others included: all branches of government will remain in place until an election held in October 2002 or 6 months from now; the current government will form a council of advisors with whom it will consult about how the government would proceed; a commission will be formed to review the 49 laws which Chavez enacted; the Plan Bolivar 2000 programs will remain in place for the moment; the Interim President and the Interim Vice President will not run for re-election in the upcoming elections. On the foreign policy front, the Venezuelan triumvirate announced that it will honor the export contract Chavez agreed with China but wrote a letter to the G-15 countries saying that it will not be able to host the G-15 Summit in Caracas as scheduled.

The United States, Spain, Chile, and El Salvador became the first countries to recognize the new interim government in Venezuela. Cuba led the nations denouncing what had happened in Venezuela while Russia said that “it is the United States that still thinks it’s in the Cold War”. Many others accepted the new government while deploring what had happened to facilitate its installation.

Guyana:
While it is easy to characterize the developing situation in international relations as a phenomena with ideological overtones, it seems to be the case that pragmatism on the international stage will be the name of the game in the current age. Case in point being Guyana, a nation making a serious transition from socialism to a market economy to the point where it is seen with favor by the IMF and the World Bank, and its current leader President Bharrat Jagdeo.

Jagdeo, who had ascended to the presidency in 1999 after his predecessor had resigned due to ill health, and who had been re-elected in March 2001, earned an economics degree in the USSR. This did not mean that he felt affinity towards Russia considering that the latter seemed to want closer relations with Venezuela, on Guyana’s west and with territorial claims on it. Jagdeo countered by becoming close to the United States, where the Guyanese are known to emigrate, and reforging bonds with the United Kingdom; visiting both Washington and London after he had been re-elected. Aid and investment flowed in and Jagdeo’s embrace of the West looked set to culminate with his attendance of the G8 Summit to be held in June 2002 at Canada.

Guyana faced territorial dispute not only to its west but also to its east. In June 2000, Suriname ordered an oil rig and service vessels which has been given license to conduct oil exploration by the Guyanese Government to cease drilling in territory still disputed by Guyana and Suriname.

Suriname:
Lower aid from the Netherlands, fiscal indiscipline, and printing money brought about inflation, the currency losing its value, and an economic crisis which turned into a political crisis. The political crisis meant that the election was brought forwards by one year to May 2000 and it was at this election that Ronald Venetiaan, himself a former president of Suriname, was elected. After his inauguration, Venetiaan found an economy in a mess and he had to devalue the currency, raise the price of of utilities, and cut subsidies. He also turned to the IMF for which among others set privatization and the rationalization of the civil service as its conditionalities. Though Venetiaan tried to haggle with the IMF over conditionalities, the economy was in too dire a strait for him to waste time negotiating.

Another tool which Venetiaan wanted to utilize to help Suriname’s economic ailment was trade. Despite its distance, news of Indonesia’s recovery from the Asian Financial Crisis and that it was having a strong year in 2000 reached Suriname, in part because it was brought there by members of Suriname’s Javanese community. Venetiaan now wanted to use this Javanese community to build closer relations with Indonesia with Minister of Social Affairs and Housing Paul Somohardjo as the conduit.

There was some success in March 2001 when Indonesia’s Minister of Industry Siswono Yudohusodo and came to visit, which netted Suriname an agreement to export alumina and banana to Indonesia; the agreement to export banana to Indonesia keeping Surland, Suriname’s agricultural state-owned enterprise, afloat. In exchange, Suriname agreed to increase its import and distribution of instant noodles, bottled tea, and other Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods.

Somohardjo was deemed successful that in a cabinet reshuffle in the middle of 2001, he was promoted to minister of trade and industry. By the time of the 2001 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Bangladesh, with Venetiaan unable to attend, Somohardjo was the second most senior member of the Surinamese Delegation behind Minister of Foreign Affairs Marie Levens. Though they did not get to meet President of Indonesia Try Sutrisno, they did meet an Indonesian delegation led by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita. At the conclusion of the meeting, Somohardjo chatted with Ginandjar. Somohardjo admitted that there was a line he did not want to cross as far as cooperation and trade with Indonesia is concerned until there is a clear winner between Try Sutrisno and his political rival, Tutut Soeharto.

Ginandjar’s response surprised him.

“I understand, you want to hedge your bets”, said Ginandjar “I’m doing the same thing too.”

Colombia:
Andres Pastrana took office as president of Colombia in August 1998 thinking that the only thing on his economic menu will be fixing the fiscal deficit left behind by his predecessor; President Ernesto Samper having increased social welfare spending but also increased the deficit. During his first months as president, Pastrana set about cutting the budget and raising revenue by increasing the VAT. By early 1999, however, it became clear that Colombia was feeling the effects of the financial crises which struck Southeast Asia, South Korea, Russia, and parts of Latin America.

With growth declining and unemployment rising, Pastrana devalued the peso in June 1999 to encourage exports, before floating it altogether in September 1999 and turning to the IMF for assistance in September 1999 when the economy showed no signs of recovering. IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus tried to argue for Colombia to have a deficit reduction target to be achieved in 3 years, social service reform, and a downsizing the public service. But with President of the United States Bill Clinton making the argument that Colombia was an important ally, Pastrana and Camdessus agreed that Colombia would commit to privatization of state banks and that the deficit reduction target will be achieved in 5 years rather than 3, with social service reform to be delayed, and no downsizing of the public service.

Colombia had a good 2000 economically with the leeway the IMF had given it but all this came to an end when Republican John McCain was elected in November 2000. While Argentina abandoned its 1:1 currency peg to the dollar in anticipation of change being on the horizon, Pastrana found himself quickly in negotiations with IMF Managing Director Stanley Fischer to review the terms that had been agreed to. The deficit reduction target is brought forward two years, there will be social service reform, and the public service will be downsized to help with the deficit reduction.

Pastrana tried to resist and made a trip to Washington to appeal to Clinton. Clinton underlined that his time was running out, saying that even if he could help, it would just be buying time until January 2001. Meeting with McCain, now president-elect, Pastrana did not find a sympathetic ear. McCain said that it will be his administration’s stance to support the IMF in enforcing its conditionalities strictly because “when one gets leniency, everyone else wants leniency too”. McCain also said that if Colombia does not cooperate, this will risk jeopardizing the “other thing” too.

With no other choice, Pastrana agreed to the IMF conditionalities and the IMF, now with the White House and the Treasury Department firmly behind it, sought to enforce the conditionalities. When Pastrana stalled implementing the reforms, Fischer, with the backing of new United States Secretary of the Treasury Phil Gramm, threatened to withheld aid. By the end of 2001, the deficit reduction had taken effect with state hospitals and state schools finding themselves understaffed because doctors and teachers were laid off.

The ”other thing” of importance for Pastrana and Colombia was the battle against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Not long after taking office, in November 1998, Pastrana extended an olive branch to FARC by establishing a Demilitarized Zone in Southern Colombia. Through starts and stops, Pastrana conducted negotiations with FARC though it was not long before he was stamped as being too soft on FARC with Pastrana’s minister of defense and some of the top officers in Colombia’s armed forces resigning in May 1999.

In addition to diplomacy, Pastrana also counted on the United States in his effort against FARC. Colombia and the United States had common cause with the illegal drugs reaching American shores having been produced and trafficked by FARC as a way to raise funds. In August 2000, after a two-year process, the Clinton Administration approved of Plan Colombia, an aid program to assist Colombia against FARC and advance the United States’ own war against drugs. Despite the bluff he faced, Pastrana did not have to worry about McCain’s commitment. Upon taking office in 2001, McCain continued Plan Colombia and rejected advice within the administration that similar aid programs be given to nations around Colombia saying that the focus needs to be on Colombia. At the same time, McCain encouraged Pastrana to take a harder stance towards FARC.

It was not all doom and gloom in Colombia. In December 2000, a lot was being made about how the Bus Rapid Transit that was just beginning to come into use was also going to be used in a faraway part of the world in Surabaya, Indonesia. A delegation led by Indonesian Minister of Transportation Soerjadi Soedirja arrived at Bogota to survey and take a ride on the Bus Rapid Transit. Pastrana, himself a former Mayor of Bogota, encouraged these developments.

The Indonesians were interested in Colombia for more than just the Bus Rapid Transit. Though not the first and foremost among Indonesia’s embassies, the Indonesian Embassy in Bogota was noted by the National Intelligence Directorate for the very meticulous way in which it kept tabs about how the government was handling FARC and various information about FARC. According to the Indonesian Embassy’s local staff, the Indonesian Embassy was well-briefed on issues such as the latest developments in negotiations, FARC’s refusal to stop taking hostages even as it sat down for negotiations how the government was handling the National Liberation Army (ELN) which was another group of rebels in Colombia.

When Pastrana arrived in Jakarta for the G-15 Summit in May 2001, the person welcoming him on behalf of the government at the airport was Chief of BAKIN Ari Sudewo. When it was pointed out that the person receiving him was Indonesia’s chief of intelligence, Pastrana could not resist making a comment.

“Perhaps it is a sign that the separatists in your country are under control that you’re trying to find out how we handle the rebels in ours”, said Pastrana.

“The separatists are dormant but not dead, Mr. President”, replied Ari Sudewo “We need the practice gathering information and making analysis about active groups.”

Though remaining detached about how the Colombian Government was handling the rebels within its borders when it public, something of the Indonesian Embassy in Bogota’s true sentiment rose to the surface when it held a celebratory dinner at the news that Pastrana froze negotiations with FARC in February 2002 after it had hijacked an airplane and kidnapped Senator Ingrid Betancourt and ordered Colombian troops to occupy the demilitarized zone he had established three years prior.

In May 2002, former Governor of Antioquia Alvaro Uribe was elected president in the nation’s Presidential Election. He promised to take a hardline against FARC.

Ecuador:
Much as in Colombia, economic homework awaited President Jamil Mahuad when he took office in August 1998 in the form of a banking crisis. A small bank had failed in the months leading to Mahuad’s inauguration but the uncertainty it caused was causing runs on other banks. Bailouts were prepared, deposit guarantees set up in an effort to provide certainty, and 16 banks had to either be closed down or receive government assistance. This banking crisis was joined by an economic crisis brought about by the contagion from Asia and Russia and falling oil prices; crude oil being Ecuador’s main exports. To top it all off, people were withdrawing their money from Ecuador because of the uncertainty and the value of of the Sucre, Ecuador’s currency began to drop. Mahuad tried to administer bitter medicine: the currency was floated, a deposit freeze and a weeklong bank holiday was initiated, and subsidies were slashed. But these measures caused uncertainty and social unrest; the cuts in fuel subsidies prompting demonstrations by taxi drivers and prompting Mahuad to back down on the fuel subsidies.

Mahuad engaged the IMF for consultations since his inauguration but it was not until June 1999 that they came to an agreement. The price for IMF aid was privatization of Ecuador’s electricity, petroleum, and telecommunication state-owned enterprises as well as increasing the VAT from 10% to 12% (the IMF originally wanted 15%), to raise revenue for the budget. On the back of this agreement with the IMF and improving oil prices in 2000, Ecuador survived despite the still high rate of poverty and the sight of Ecuadorians emigrating outside the country for better opportunities. 2000 proved to be a greater than expected year for Ecuador and the words “modest recovery” seemed to be on everyone’s lips.

Then in January 2001, the IMF wished to revisit the agreement it had signed with Ecuador. The IMF now asked for the VAT, which had been increased to 12% as agreed, to be increased to 15% as it had originally requested. Mahuad tried to stand his ground and haggle but Ecuador’s economic recovery was tenuous as the Sucre lost some value during the negotiation period. It was February 2001 that Mahuad agreed to the new terms, realizing that the economic recovery was not strong enough for Mahuad not to agree. He was heard to grumble that if the IMF managed to get Colombia, which was considered a close ally of the United States, to comply then Ecuador did not stand a chance.

Ecuador and the IMF’s agreement had the developing world jumping on Ecuador’s side with the IMF falling under criticism and condemnation for imposing harsh terms just as Ecuador was recovering. The IMF shrugged off the criticism with Fischer off-handedly, others said arrogantly, that Ecuador’s economy can take the terms because the economy was “on an upwards trajectory”. Ecuador itself seemed to do all right in 2001; the economy widely seen to have been past the critical stage and with China increasing its imports of Ecuadorian oil. There are also suspicions that Ecuadorians near the Colombian border are suspected to have begun getting into the drug trade and earning income from that end.

The situation was not good for Mahuad who found himself trapped between an IMF eager to see its terms enforced and an uncooperative legislature for a few months. He eventually secured the increase in VAT and the cuts to subsidies but the price he had to pay was a commitment not to run for re-election.

2002 was an election year. Vice President Alvaro Noboa sought to use his incumbency and the nation’s economic performance as the means to obtain the presidency though this also meant he was associated with the government’s austerity measures. When Election Day arrived in May 2002, it would be former Vice President Leon Roldos who emerged the winner. Roldos was a moderate socialist and ran an agenda of promising to implement IMF’s reforms and boost economic growth so that Ecuador can graduate from the IMF and go its own way economically. Events in Venezuela also helped deliver victory to him.

Peru:
Much as other nations in the continent, Peru also felt the impact of the economic crisis which started in Asia. Its economy slowed down but it would be the political arena rather than in economics that Peru would face its crisis during these years.

In December 1999, despite controversy, President Alberto Fujimori announced that he will be running for a third term in the Peruvian Presidential Elections. The present constitution placed a limit of two terms on the president but Fujimori presented the argument that he had been president prior to the constitutional provision and thus not subject to it. In the coming months, Fujimori would lean on his incumbency; inaugurating projects, smearing his opponents, and mobilizing his supporters to intimidate the opposition. Election Day came in April 2000, in a field of multiple candidates Fujimori emerged with the most votes but not the 50% required to win. A run-off will be required.

In the aftermath of the election, demonstrations were held in Peru protesting the irregularities in the way the elections were held. Around the world, the way Peru held its elections were also criticized including by the OAS. In Peru, Alejandro Toledo, an economist who now found himself being Fujimori’s opponent in the run-off called on the elections to be delayed until June and that if this condition was not fulfiled he would boycott the elections. Electoral observers both domestic and international also agreed with this saying that more time was needed. Fujimori himself initially reacted with defiance, saying that he would not delay the elections.

It was to the world’s surprise that in early May, Clinton managed to convince Fujimori to delay the election until June. Though initially thought of as a victory, there were criticisms of Clinton when it became clear that in exchange for the delay of the election and for the election to have been held under the supervision of the OAS, Clinton had given the assurance that there would be no more questions about the legitimacy of the elections whatever the result. Clinton would later say that that he had Austria’s isolation in the EU leading to it drifting in Russia’s direction in mind and that he did not want that to happen in South America. Once Fujimori agreed to delay the election, Clinton shifted to pressuring Toledo to participate in the election.

Thus it was that the nation prepared to hold the run-off elections under the OAS and Carter Center’s supervision. Fujimori and Toledo prepared by looking for support from among candidates eliminated in the first round of elections. Fujimori obtained the support of Federico Salas whom he promised the office of prime minister while Toledo got the support of other candidates. There was less intimidation, at least overtly, to satisfy the observers though Fujimori continued to use his incumbency by inaugurating projects.

Election Day came in late June 2000 and in what Toledo called “The day the bad guys won”, Fujimori secured 54% of the votes. In the aftermath of the election, it was declared by the OAS that the run-off election was an improvement over the first round of elections and could be declared legitimate though it was still from perfect. In late July 2000, Fujimori was inaugurated for a third term.

That was not the end. Mere weeks after Fujimori had been inaugurated, Chief of the Servicio Inteligencia Nacional (SIN) Vladimiro Montesinos was found to have been involved in the sales of weapons to FARC in Colombia. This placed Fujimori in an awkward situation since Montesinos was seen as his regime’s power behind the throne. Immediately Fujimori came under pressure with United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright telling him to dismiss Montesinos. Domestically, there were similar calls both inside and outside of Fujimori’s regime; Montesinos had to go. As though things could not get any worse, in September 2000 a videotape surfaced of Montesinos bribing a member of Congress to switch their support in the legislature to Fujimori’s Peru 2000 political party.

Overnight Fujimori’s grip on power looked tenuous while Toledo took the the streets with demonstrators to protest; calling for Fujimori to resign and new elections to be held. 2 days after Montesinos’ tape surfaced, Fujimori announced that he was dismissing Montesinos as Chief of SIN and that he will be dissolving SIN. In response to this, Montesinos escaped Peru seeking asylum in Panama complete with severance pay given to him by Fujimori. Fujimori cautioned those asking for new elections saying that the election of June 2000 has been considered legitimate.

The next few days were crucial. In the vacuum left behind by Montesinos, First Vice President Francisco Tudela and Frederico Salas, who became prime minister as Fujimori promised, banded together and began coming to various arrangements. With the cabinet it was to secure agreement that Fujimori would resign, with the military it was that they will not be prosecuted for alleged human rights violations, and with members of congress being drawn into their coalition it was that no fresh elections would be held. In all of these arrangements, Montesinos was an important factor; Tudela and Salas’ commitment that Montesinos would not be allowed back in the country and that his power would be broken clinching their support. In Washington, receiving updates of what was going on from the US Embassy in Lima and the CIA, Clinton said that this was the best possible ending.

Thus it was that with the backing of the cabinet, military, and congress that Tudela and Salas met with Fujimori to call for his resignation. Realizing his time was up, Fujimori asked Tudela that he be allowed to leave for Japan after he had resigned. Tudela granted this. Events now happened quickly. First Fujimori appeared on television to announce that he had resigned, then Congress accepted his resignation with an easy majority though hardcore Fujimorists voted to refuse Fujimori’s resignation, and then Tudela was sworn in as president.

Speaking at his first press conference, Tudela made good on his promise to ban Montesinos from returning to Peru saying that he will be arrested were he to return. Over the next few days, Tudela would begin purging the cabinet and the military of Montesinos’ allies, supported by those who had been forced into submitting to his power. If there were any further tapes of Montesinos’ blackmailing other members of the political elite, they were never found.

The transition from Fujimori to Tudela worked wonders for the Peruvian economy. Having slowed down during the months of the presidential election and the run-offs and then in the lead-up to Fujimori’s resignation, Peru went on to have modest economic growth in 2001 despite the economic downturn.

---
Venezuela and Peru took up the most time writing up. Venezuela’s POD are the interim government handling things better and not dissolving anything which led to them being seen as dictatorial and opened the way for Chavez to be restored to power.

Peru’s POD is that because Fujimori delayed the run-offs and said run-offs was seen as being more legitimate, the US settled with accepting Tudela, Salas and Co moving to push Fujimori. OTL, Tudela resigned as vice president when Montesinos returned to Peru in October but here obviously the crisis doesn’t get drawn out.

The IMF’s story ITTL is essentially spending 1998-2000 being more lenient and having countries sign up to their program because they are seen to be lenient (Ecuador does not agree to IMF conditionalities after Mahuad was overthrown) and then suddenly acting all tough under McCain.

Suriname’s reluctance to go all in with Try stems from the fact that the Soehartos has business investments there (https://www.google.co.id/books/edit...uriname+soeharto&pg=PA150&printsec=frontcover).

 

[Pio2013]

Its interesting, no matter which Contemporary TL is, a "Cold War" its always latent, like a constant.

A great update, very well explained. Wouldn't be surprised if Colombia and Indonesia sign cooperation agreements, mostly on Internal Security and Intelligence.

 

[GSD310]

Its interesting, no matter which Contemporary TL is, a "Cold War" its always latent, like a constant.

A great update, very well explained. Wouldn't be surprised if Colombia and Indonesia sign cooperation agreements, mostly on Internal Security and Intelligence.

I guess from a writing standpoint it makes things interesting because there's a conflict. From a historical standpoint, I think a challenger or would be challenger is bound to emerge sooner or later.

Regarding the "Cold War", there's going to be nations that think the situation between the US and Russia is the new Cold War, there are going to be nations who think in non-ideological terms, and there will be nations thinking that this is a multipolar world and they should be one of the "poles".

ITTL, something will happen in the future involving Colombia that gets Indonesia thinking about how it does things when it faces similar situations.

 

[GSD310]

Bolivia:
In President Hugo Banzer, the West had a leader who was willing to go along with its agenda. In 1998, Banzer launched Plan Dignidad, a program which seeks to eradicate the cocaine trade in Bolivia and which had reduced coca production by 45% in 2000. On the economic front, the government’s controversial effort to privatize water as part of its commitment to the IMF and the World Bank resulted in higher water tariffs but no improvements in services; which in turn led to riots in the city of Cochabamba in April 2000. Faced with such popular resistance, the IMF allowed water privatization to be delayed. Banzer himself was diagnosed with cancer in 2001 and decided to resign the presidency.

Banzer was succeeded by his young vice president Jorge Quiroga. The new President of Bolivia was American-educated and had had stints at the IMF and the World Bank as a consultant. This background, along with popular resistance to its conditionalities, meant that the IMF and the World Bank applied a light touch on the new administration. Indeed, it was Quiroga himself who revealed in November 2001 that eventually water privatization would continue.

By 2002, however, the nation was no longer paying attention to him. A General Election was due to be held in June 2002 and Quiroga was forbidden from running for re-election because the constitution forbade consecutive terms. The presidential race centered around former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada who had reformed the economy during his term and Mayor of Cochabamba Manfred Reyes Villa who had initiated the water privatization that led to the demonstrations and riots in 2000.

The dark horse candidate was Member of Congress Evo Morales of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS). Originally seen as a candidate representing coca growers, Morales had mobilized the MAS to participate in demonstrations against water privatization to show coca growing was not the only issue he was interested in. Morales also campaigned on an anti-American platform, something which drew the ire of the US Embassy in La Paz. All of these factors -the coca growers’ resentment at Banzer’s Plan Dignidad, popular resistance to the water privatization symbolized by Cochabamba, and anti-United States sentiment- combined to give Morales a real chance at the presidency. That news arrived in April 2002 from Venezuela that Hugo Chavez was overthrown only galvanized support for Morales, bringing with it the very real possibility of a Morales Presidency.

Brazil:
With the worst of the crisis already past in 1999 and a strong year economically in 2000, Brazil looked ready to reduce the crisis to its rearview mirror. At the nation’s helm, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso surveyed at the multipolar world that was developing and thought perhaps the time had come for Brazil to continue asserting itself on the world stage after some years focusing inwards because of the economic crisis.

On the regional scale, Cardoso expressed what Brazil had to say in front of the United States’ President John McCain. At the OAS’ Summit of the Americas in April 2001 when the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was being discussed, Cardoso said that Brazil preferred to continue working on the Mercosur Trade Bloc it had established with Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay. In April 2002, Cardoso was called again to express Brazil’s opinion on certain developments. Without using strong words the way Russia did and without mentioning the United States by name, Cardoso said that South America’s inability to stop what happened should not be seen as acquiescencea and called on Venezuela’s government to legitimize itself as soon as possible.

Cardoso also began expressing Brazil’s views at a wider scale. At the 2000 G-15 Summit in Cairo, Egypt, Cardoso expressed his belief that the nations which will successfully overcome the recent crisis are those able to combine prudent economic policy to restore market confidence with the ability to make sure that the necessary policies does not cause social unrest. He repeated these sentiments at the 2001 G-15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. With an IMF that wants to impose stricter conditions, Cardoso said that it was pointless if strict adherence of certain policy prescriptions resulted in more harm than good.

One area where Brazil was coy about its views was UN Security Council Reform. The topic was brought up in bilateral meetings between Cardoso and Prime Minister of India Atal Bahari Vajpayee during the 2001 G-15 Summit. Vajpayee said that “Herr Schroeder and I” would like UN Security Council Reform to be placed back on the agenda again, that the UN Security Council’s permanent membership should include a Latin American nation, and that this nation should be Brazil. The idea that the UN Security Council could include Brazil was not without its appeal but Cardoso said that Argentina was not likely to approve and that for the moment he wanted Brazil to prioritize good relations with Argentina over a UN Security Council seat.

Brazil’s stature was indeed on the rise. In late 2001, it was identified as one of five nations (the others being Russia, India, China and Indonesia) set to be an economic power in the 21st century.

Despite all the signs that it was becoming more prominent on the global stage, however, Brazil still could not afford to forget its domestic affairs. By the middle of 2001, it became apparent that Brazil was going through an energy crisis. A hot summer had dried up Brazil’s dams and electricity rationing which began to take into effect in June 2001.

On the economic front, Brazil had to deal with the international economic downturn. But Brazil had the additional “problem” of Argentina. In the aftermath of President of Argentina Eduardo Duhalde’s decision to take the Peso away from its 1:1 peg with the American dollar, Brazilian exports now had additional competition in the shape of Argentinian exports. This was compensated by China and India’s demand for commodities such as soybean and oil. Such was the way Brazil struggled through 2001.

2002 was an election year which will include the Presidential Election. From the Workers’ Party (PT), Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was ready to compete again, this being the fourth time that he will be running for president. Cardoso had defeated Lula in 1994 and 1998 but would not be running again because he was term-limited. Cardoso thus consulted with his coalition which comprised of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PDSB), the Liberal Front Party (PFL), and Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) about who to nominate.

Cardoso, originating from the PDSB, was in favor of nominating Governor of Ceara Tasso Jairisetti citing his popularity in the governing coalition. But there was strong support for Minister of Health Jose Serra within the PDSB. Serra was acceptable to Cardoso but the latter doubted his viability as a candidate. The PFL offered one of their own; Governor of Maranhao Roseana Sarney. Daughter of a former president, Sarney’s main selling point was that she has been to match well against Lula in the opinion polls and on occasions would find herself in the lead.

That was the way it went in early 2002 as Sarney and Serra jockeyed for influence within the coalition. Serra even went as far as claiming to Cardoso that he has evidence of “financial improprieties” on the part of Sarney. Cardoso, however, was already of the opinion that the economy would be mismanaged if it were to fall into Lula’s hands, that Brazil has an opportunity to play a bigger role on the global stage in a multipolar world, and that as a result, ensuring that the governing coalition had the best chance of winning the election was important. In March 2002, Cardoso told Sarney that he would back her as presidential candidate but that in exchange, she would have to pick Serra as her running mate. Sarney tried to bargain to try to get Jereisatti, knowing Cardoso’s preference, but Cardoso said that Serra as her running mate will be the PDSB’s price for foregoing the presidential nomination.

Thus it was that after jockeying with one another, Sarney and Serra found themselves part of the same ticket. Their first test came in April 2002 with news of Chavez’ downfall. Lula took the lead again in the polls as the nation sympathized with Chavez’ plight but Sarney’s numbers, whilst taking a slight hit, remained stable and began to recover again by May 2002. The economic environment also remained conducive, a sign that Sarney’s candidacy was seen as viable in the eyes of the market.

Chile:
In March 2000, Ricardo Lagos was inaugurated and became the new president of Chile. Though originating from the center-left, Lagos was a believer in free trade and identified free trade agreements with the United States and the EU as goals to be achieved by president. Negotiations begun in the final month of the Clinton Administration and continued into the McCain Administration with the latter wanting to fast track negotiations. This culminated in December 2001 when Lagos visited Washington DC where he and President of the United States John McCain signed the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

The EU proved to be more challenging but Lagos was not discouraged and looked elsewhere in the world. Southeast Asia beckoned. In October 2001 at the APEC Summit, Lagos met with Sultan of Brunei Hassanal Bolkiah. Bolkiah said that the implementation of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement running into a dead-end, nations in ASEAN starting to take sides about how it should approach China, and Brunei wanting to look after its own interests. Lagos left Shanghai having agreed to begin negotiations for a Brunei-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

In February 2002, it was Singapore that came. Singaporean Minister for Foreign Affairs Lee Hsien Loong came to Santiago to meet with Lagos making similar arguments. Lagos would spend most of the meeting commiserating with the Lee, the latter receiving news that he was diagnosed with a form of cancer, but by the time Lee left, negotiations have begun with Singapore for a Singapore-Chile Free Trade Agreement.

Paraguay:
It was a period of political instability. When Lino Oviedo from the Colorado Party was banned from participating in the 1998 Presidential Elections because he received a prison sentence for masterminding a military coup in 1996, his place was taken by Raul Cubas who went on to be elected president but was seen as Oviedo’s puppet. Taking office in August 1998, Cubas’ unilaterally reduced Oviedo’s sentence and freed him. When the Supreme Court ordered Oviedo to be sent back to jail, Cubas refused and preparations were made to impeach him. Impeachment occurred in March 1999 after Vice President Raul Argana was allegedly assassinated by those with links to Oviedo and after the situation deteriorated to demonstrations. Cubas resigned but with the vice presidency vacant, President of the Senate Luis Angel Gonzalez Macchi succeeded to the presidency.

Gonzalez Macchi’s presidency was no less turbulent. He lost a majority in the legislature after his coalition with the Authentic Radical Liberal Party (PLRA) broke apart, he had to settle with a vice president from a different party when the PLRA’s Julio Cesar Franco won an election to fill the vacant vice presidency in August 2000, he survived a military coup attempt in May 2000 and impeachment effort in August 2001, and his luxury car was found to have been a stolen car. By August 2001, Franco had supported a resolution calling for Gonzalez Macchi to resign. Gonzalez Macchi was under pressure for even the Colorado Party criticized him for the way he had led the country. The only thing that saved Gonzalez Macchi was the Colorado Party’s distaste for Franco which it alleged has links to Oviedo and which it saw as being inexperienced to take over the helm of the country.

The economy placed its own pressure. After Brazil had devalued its currency in 1999 and Argentina no longer pegged its currency to the dollar, Paraguay found its already struggling economy facing even more travails as its goods now had to compete with Brazilian and Argentinian goods which had become cheaper. Growth in 2001 reached minus territory

Circumstances can work in mysterious ways. Paraguay needed a large market where it can export its agricultural produce. At the same time, in the aftermath of 9/11, Paraguay’s tri-border area with Brazil and Argentina has been identified as a front on the War on Terror as the presence of Hezbollah and Hamas has been detected there. Finally, Paraguay wanted to open its first embassy in Southeast Asia.

In April 2002, Minister of Foreign Relations Jose Antonio Moreno Ruffinelli arrived in Jakarta. As President of Indonesia Try Sutrisno was in Malaysia, Moreno was received by Vice President of Indonesia JB Sumarlin. The talks were productive. Sumarlin expressed Indonesia’s deep feeling of honor that Paraguay has chosen Indonesia as the site where it wants to open its embassy and that there is a market for Paraguayan agricultural produce such as soybeans and beans.

It was on the question on assisting Paraguay in the War of Terror that Sumarlin raised a question saying that he remembered that the McCain Administration has expressed agreement in working together with Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay in the tri-border area. Moreno said that after Chavez’ overthrow, there is some distaste about working with the United States and that Paraguay, at least, is looking for other options. Noting that Hezbollah was backed by Iran and the fact that Indonesia is building its relationship with Iran, Sumarlin said that he will persuade Try to put Hezbollah’s South American presence on the agenda.

The meeting ended with Moreno discussing Indonesia’s relationship with China, in the process reminding Sumarlin that Paraguay still had a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan.

Argentina:
“Much is made about how I “famously” took the Peso from its pegged 1:1 to the American Dollar upon hearing news that Senator John McCain would become the United States’ 43rd President. The truth was I didn’t feel famous. First, Minister of Economy Domingo Cavallo who I had recruited and who had established the policy, resigned. Then the value of the Peso took a tumble as it adjusted to the fact that it was no longer 1:1 with the American Dollar. It wasn’t until January 2001, when Senator McCain became President McCain, that the exchange rate stabilized and I began getting word that our exports were becoming competitive. We were not out of the woods yet, however, because by March 2001 we had the food and mouth situation and our beef exports had to be suspended just when the market prospects looked well.

I felt vindicated, however, when the IMF came knocking at my door in February 2001 wanting to revise the agreement Argentina had agreed with it upon my inauguration. I thought that whatever austerity measures they wanted me to take, Argentina at least had its exports to lean on.

The government quickly came under pressure by the IMF to undertake more “decisive reforms”. The initial agreement I had agreed with the IMF upon my inauguration in 1999 had agreed to spending cuts in the shape of efficiencies and abolishing programs that overlap with one another. Now spending cuts meant cuts to the salaries and pensions of civil servants and a reduction in payments by the federal government to the provinces. Even the public works projects that I had initiated after I had inaugurated to help create employment had to be rolled back.

I thought the measures were too excessive and worried that the budget cuts and the salary cuts could lead to unrest. When I appealed to United States Secretary of the Treasury Phil Gramm, I did not find a symphatetic ear.

The experience left a sour taste in my mouth and made me think about how Argentina can survive on the international stage. My predecessor, President Menem had grown close with the United States but I felt that Argentina could not continue on this course. At the same I did not think that the solution was to get into the spirit of the “New Cold War” and drift in Russia and China’s direction. Minister of Foreign Affairs, International Trade, and Worship Nestor Kirchner advised me that I should attend the G-15 Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia. I had originally delegated Argentina’s attendance at the summit to Nestor because I wanted to monitor the IMF’s austerity measures being implemented but he convinced me that the member nations might be more “Argentina’s crowd”.

In addition to visiting stalls selling tempeh and tofu made from Argentinian soybeans in Jakarta, I also spoke about Argentina’s current situation. President of Colombia Andres Pastrana agreed with me though President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade, President of Kenya Daniel arap Moi, and Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem were more enthusiastic. At the end of the summit, I told Nestor that Argentina should be attending more of these kinds of forums. When he suggested that Argentina rejoin the Non-Aligned Movement, I could only give my approval. In November 2001, I personally headed the Argentinian delegation at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Bangladesh and was given a standing ovation when Argentina’s rejoining was announced.

Back home, the government dutifully administered what we had agreed to with the IMF. The economy was stagnant due to the downturn around the globe internationally in 2001 and here and there there were protests against the policies enacted. Even so, our exporters were doing well and employing people to help meet overseas demand for our commodities especially from nations like China, India, and Indonesia. Our nation was going to survive 2001 and our prospects looked even better in 2002 when nations around the world began opening their doors to our beef exports again.”

-Excerpts from Eduardo Duhalde: The Memoirs

Uruguay:
Uruguay was not so much affected by the crisis that hit Brazil and Argentina as it was by Brazil and Argentina’s response to it. Brazil’s devaluation of the Real in 1999 deprived Uruguay of an export market on the continent. What put pressure on Uruguay’s economy was Duhalde’s decision to cease pegging the Peso to the American Dollar in November 2000. As the Peso devalued, Uruguay’s exports became more expensive and Uruguay itself became a more expensive place for Argentinians to invest and go on holiday to.

When the food and mouth outbreak began to adversely effect Uruguay’s beef export, a key export commodity in Uruguay, and as the economy began to stagnate, President Jorge Batlle took the decision in July 2001 to float the Uruguayan Peso. As the value of the Uruguayan Peso adjusts to a market price, Uruguay’s exports becomes more competitive as large nations with emerging economies begin to crowd around looking for commodities or materials it can import in Uruguay.

---
WBrazil does better ITTL and gets out of the crisis earlier because it got leniency from the IMF in 1998-2000 and so it begins to think about what it can do on the world stage. Sarney being the presidential candidate of the PDSB-PFL-PTB coalition is due to Cardoso thinking that winning is important. The consequence of this is that the PFL doesn’t withdraw from Cardoso’s coalition as in OTL. I haven’t decided who wins between Sarney and Lula but just want to give Lula a good fight and avoid people panicking and taking their money out from Brazil.

On Cardoso preferring good relations with Argentina over UN Security Council Reform https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2158244018801098

Sarney’s “financial improprieties” is the reason she had to withdraw from being a candidate OTL http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1928753.stm

ITTL Argentina avoids an economic crash, riots, and 5 presidents in two weeks because they had more lenient conditions by the IMF in 1999-2000 and the earlier end of the pegged currency but it can’t be said to have recovered yet. Somehow when one thinks of the NAM, the countries that come to mind are Asian and African countries. I’m still feeling around but let’s see if Argentina’s trajectory leads to it becoming prominent in NAM.

The resentment against the IMF ITTL is not only going to be because they are becoming more strict once they realize the McCain Administration are backing them office but also because countries feel they are doing well with the more lenient approach and it’s not until the IMF gets them to sign on to the more strict conditionalities that they face some struggles.

Chile is an example of why I can say the butterflies are in full flow at the moment in the ITTL world. Chile’s why Brunei and Singapore are taking a neutral stance in the face-off between the Jakarta Bloc and the Cambodia-Malaysia-Myanmar Bloc in ASEAN and not in a rush to take sides. OTL, Chile’s cooperation with Singapore, Brunei, and New Zealand is what leads to the TPP.

That’s South America done. Off we go to Africa now.

 

[Pio2013]

Paraguay has a low level insurgency, that sometimes kidnaps businessmen and army convoys for ransom. Probably Indonesia experience in Philipines will serve them greatly.

As i see, SA nations are begining to compete with their exports. Would be practical for them to consider a Mercosur-Indonesia (or Jakarta bloc) free trade agreement? We will see later.

And i agree that Chile has the most pragmatic approach ITTL. Treaties with an international entrepot and a key oil producer, for me its a big deal.

 

[GSD310]

Paraguay has a low level insurgency, that sometimes kidnaps businessmen and army convoys for ransom. Probably Indonesia experience in Philipines will serve them greatly.

As i see, SA nations are begining to compete with their exports. Would be practical for them to consider a Mercosur-Indonesia (or Jakarta bloc) free trade agreement? We will see later.

And i agree that Chile has the most pragmatic approach ITTL. Treaties with an international entrepot and a key oil producer, for me its a big deal.

Yes, the insurgents in Paraguay will be over the horizon.

Don't forget it's not only a matter of the South American nations competing with their exports but also a case of the early 2000s commodities boom occurring. The ITTL version of the commodities boom will be similar to its OTL version. The main difference in this TL is that in addition to exporting its commodities, Indonesia will also be one of the emerging economies looking around for commodities for its own economic development.

 

[Fialnir]

Phew... Finally made it to the latest update
Just wanna say it's been a really REALLY great experience reading this and can't wait for more(especially on how in the hell is Tutut winning).

P.S. I'm still salty about Agus Wirahadikusumah's death

 

[GSD310]

Phew... Finally made it to the latest update
Just wanna say it's been a really REALLY great experience reading this and can't wait for more(especially on how in the hell is Tutut winning).

P.S. I'm still salty about Agus Wirahadikusumah's death

Welcome to the club. I’m a pretty slow burn storyteller kind of guy and think that readers like you and others who have read this all in one go probably will notice things more. Any favorite moments or people?

Agus Wirahadikusumah is a tricky one. He clearly has a lot of ideas and isn’t afraid to express it as can be seen in his OTL version. ITTL, there being no May 1998 means that ABRI is not in a bad place as their OTL version and there’s probably less of a platform for Agus to stand up and say things like Dual Function should be abolished. If it’s unpopular enough as it is in OTL within the TNI, imagine how even more unpopular it would be ITTL within ABRI. As you can see in the TL, Dual Function is to be refined but not to be abolished.

Speculations not withstanding that something happened to Agus to cause his death, I had him died on the same day as OTL because it seemed to me like a sudden death due to heart attack. On the other hand, Baharuddin Lopa is still alive ITTL. OTL, he seemed to die as a result of exhaustion from travel leading to a heart attack in July 2001. As he didn’t travel in July 2001, he didn’t get a heart attack and he didn’t die.

Nonetheless, Agus’ ideas are there in some form if you read the ABRI National Leadership Meeting updates. The idea that ABRI should get out of business or least be more accountable is advocated by officers close to Agus.

I had wanted to post an update but this week is a bit hectic. Hopefully I’ll have time next week.

Regarding the TL:
I will take my time posting the updates of how various nations are doing as I hope not to do them again for quite a while. The aim now 4.5 years since the POD and with the butterflies in full flow, is to start having the various ITTL nations take up their positions.

Take up their positions for what you may ask? Well, it will be something that involves Indonesia but where the other nations are positioned will be crucial too.

 

[Fialnir]

Welcome to the club. I’m a pretty slow burn storyteller kind of guy and think that readers like you and others who have read this all in one go probably will notice things more. Any favorite moments or people?

Agus Wirahadikusumah is a tricky one. He clearly has a lot of ideas and isn’t afraid to express it as can be seen in his OTL version. ITTL, there being no May 1998 means that ABRI is not in a bad place as their OTL version and there’s probably less of a platform for Agus to stand up and say things like Dual Function should be abolished. If it’s unpopular enough as it is in OTL within the TNI, imagine how even more unpopular it would be ITTL within ABRI. As you can see in the TL, Dual Function is to be refined but not to be abolished.

Speculations not withstanding that something happened to Agus to cause his death, I had him died on the same day as OTL because it seemed to me like a sudden death due to heart attack. On the other hand, Baharuddin Lopa is still alive ITTL. OTL, he seemed to die as a result of exhaustion from travel leading to a heart attack in July 2001. As he didn’t travel in July 2001, he didn’t get a heart attack and he didn’t die.

Nonetheless, Agus’ ideas are there in some form if you read the ABRI National Leadership Meeting updates. The idea that ABRI should get out of business or least be more accountable is advocated by officers close to Agus.

I had wanted to post an update but this week is a bit hectic. Hopefully I’ll have time next week.

Regarding the TL:
I will take my time posting the updates of how various nations are doing as I hope not to do them again for quite a while. The aim now 4.5 years since the POD and with the butterflies in full flow, is to start having the various ITTL nations take up their positions.

Take up their positions for what you may ask? Well, it will be something that involves Indonesia but where the other nations are positioned will be crucial too.

Favourite moments for me would be when Try supporters threw their membership card in front of Tutut, restoration of order in Timor and Maluku(get rekt subversive elements), and military reform/expansion stuff(though disagree on how much the army is expanding but yeah probably because the army's ego on how they don't wanna be outnumbered by the police+Dwifungsi is in place so the army can be used to be a policing force). As for favourite people other than the obvious one like Edi Sudradjat, our beloved duo head of state+government, and from the opposition Akbar Tanjung. I would probably say Soegiarto(I'm still dendam kesumat about how died).

On Agus Wirahadikusumah, yeah in no way he can do his radical reforms in the armed forces, i just wanna see how far he can go for his reforms in this TL for the president would probably support some if not most of his professionalisation reform and calm him down on others(uncovering past corruption) considering he need a "clean" army if he wanna go against China. Probably head of a powerful ABRI Training Command in a way that Wiranto's clique can control the present but for the sake of Indonesia, the reformist will control the future. But that's just my headcannon, probably too optimistic 🤤.

Anyway, based on the last paragraph. THE HYPE IS REAL... Though will wait till "the world americas part" is done(i'm sorry but it's soooooo boring 🤣, not your fault. It's just how it is over there).

 

[Fialnir]

That’s South America done. Off we go to Africa now.

Oh wait it's ̶f̶i̶n̶a̶l̶l̶y̶ done, on to our Indomie colonial possesion we go

 

[GSD310]

South Africa:
South Africa had a busy domestic agenda. There was the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) program which sought increase black participation and ownership in the South African economy. There was a Strategic Defence Package, a defence procurement program for South African National Defence Force (SANDF). President Thabo Mbeki’s main interest however, even as he worked hard on these programs, was South Africa’s position on the world stage.

When it comes to the “New Cold War” or the “Multipolar Moment”, depending on the international relations expert, South Africa’s position is ambivalent. Mbeki, having attended the Forum On China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in September 2000, was wary of China’s intention to provide generous aid to Africa; saying that Africa should be careful of trading old colonialism for new colonialism; this was the kind of statement that was welcomed in Washington. On the other hand, for a nation that fancies a leadership role for itself on the continent, a multipolar world was not unwelcome with Mbeki beginning to propagate the idea that South Africa was Africa’s “Pole”.

After handing over the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement to Bangladesh in October 2001, Mbeki began to look for other ways to advance South Africa’s ambition on the world stage. Though it rankled him that South Africa was not included as part of the BRICI economies, it was precisely this grouping that Mbeki saw South Africa being a part of. Visiting Brazil in January 2002, Mbeki told President of Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso about formalizing BRICI and adding South Africa in it. Cardoso responded well to the idea.

Mbeki does go about advancing South Africa in confrontative and haphazard fashion. At the World Conference against Racism in Durban in September 2001, Mbeki criticized the American and Israeli delegations for withdrawing from the conference over communique language that wanted to single out Israel and Zionism and berated European countries for sending low-level delegations to the conference. The American and Israeli delegations responded with criticisms of their own though Prime Minister of Russia Vladimir Putin, who led the Russian delegation, hailed Mbeki as a “world leader to be reckoned with”. Mbeki’s continuing denialism when it comes HIV/AIDs was also a continued source of controversy for a nation aspiring for a more prominent role on the world stage.

Lesotho:
27th February 2002 (The Director’s Cut):
“Suppose that we rely on a small neighboring nation to provide water for Jakarta and Surabaya. Then that neighboring nation goes through political unrest and the water supply to Jakarta and Surabay becomes jeopardized”, explained President Try Sutrisno “What do you think I should do?”

“You would have to send in ABRI troops to secure things over there, Mr. President, because our interests are at stake”, replied State Secretary Edi Sudrajat.

“That easy, huh?” asked the President.

“The actual situation’s will usually be more complicated than a hypothetical”, replied Edi “This is only a hypothetical situation, right?”

“It’s a real situation”, said the President “The large nation is South Africa, the small nation providing the water is Lesotho. Lesotho had an election in 1998, it was disputed, there was the possibility of a coup, and South Africa…well South Africa and Botswana…they send in troops for an intervention or an invasion, depending on the point of view..”

“I take it there’s little mention of securing water supply in South Africa’s official statements”, enquired Edi.

“The focus was on restoring a situation that could have turned out of control”, explained the President “Though the critics of this are quick to point out that South Africa are only doing it to secure their water supply.”

“You can’t please everybody”, muttered Edi “Does that mean Lesotho is occupied by South Africa now?”

“South Africa occupied it for 8 months but it also set up a new electoral commission and a quasi-parliament to conduct new elections due next May”, replied the President “There’s probably no need to occupy it permanently anyway since Lesotho’s economy is reliant on South Africa’s.”

Edi looked behind the President’s shoulder and nodded.

“Well good to see that you’re reading your briefing books carefully”, said Edi “But President Mbeki’s here and it’s time for you to meet him.”

Namibia and Botswana:
While Mbeki continued with his denialism on AIDS, South Africa’s immediate neighbors were fighting it; in the process establishing AIDS as the “New Cold War’s” first battlefield.

In addition to President Sam Nujoma’s exhortation for gays and lesbians to be arrested, Namibia received aid and assistance from China in its fight against AIDS. Bicycles for door-to-door counselling in rural areas and condoms in the hundreds of thousands were given by the Chinese Government during a visit by Chairman of the NPC Li Peng in June 2001. Nujoma accepted the aid and the opportunity to build closer relations with a nation with a larger market for Namibian exports for South Africa and which can help Namibia not be so reliant on Africa.

In Botswana, AIDS was a blot on a nation where the democratic institutions and compliance with liberal economic reforms continued to earn it praise from the West. August 2001 saw the US Leadership Against HIV/AIDS Act being signed into law, providing extra aid and funding to AIDS prevention in Africa as well as specifying benchmarks in AIDS prevention over a specified period of time. Though the aid was disbursed to other African nations including in Namibia, it was clear that the United States saw Botswana as its anti-AIDS spearhead. In March 2002, Vice President of the United States George W. Bush whose office was put in charge of administering the law arrived in Gaborone where he and President Festus Mogae inspected the programs that had already been set up under the auspices of the law.

Swaziland:
King Mswati III hosted President of Taiwan James Soong in October 2001; Swaziland one of few African countries which has a diplomatic relationship with Taiwan. The highlight of the visit was Mswati and Soong signing an agreement committing Taiwan to provide aid for AIDS prevention in Swaziland. Not wanting to be drawn about his host’s polygamous habit, Soong said that while he wanted closer relations with the mainland, he will not “sell out” Taiwan’s interest and will look to continue building on the existing bilateral relationships that Taiwan has.

Mozambique and Madagascar:
President Joaquim Chissano continues to be hounded by allegations from his vanquished 1999 Presidential Election opponent and leader of the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) Afonso Dhlakama. Throughout 2000, Dhlakama alternated between threatening to return to the days of the Mozambican Civil War between Renamo and Chissano’s National Mozambican Front (Frenamo) and offering a power-sharing arrangement where Chissano would appoint Renamo cadres as governors in provinces where Renamo had emerged victorious. Chissano was not moved.

With an eye to the New Cold War, Dhlakama thought that the environment would be more conducive to get international support for Renamo’s cause. But that turned out not to be the case. The Americans thought Mozambique under Frelimo as an example of a country that is developing itself in the aftermath of a civil war while the Russians were of the opinion that Mozambique would not be the “battleground on which they will meet the United States”. Dhlakama’s ears perked, however, when watching Chissano attend the 2001 Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Bangladesh and lambast Indonesia for its “continuing and illegal occupation” of East Timor.

In March 2002, Dhlakama sent Jose De Castro, the Renamo member in charge of external relations to Indonesia to appeal for its support. De Castro saw a bustling economy and a nation that could possibly have both the resources and the reason to support Renamo if it was to conduct a civil war. His meeting with Indonesia’s Chief of BAKIN Ari Sudewo was delayed owing to his host having to monitor the coup in Myanmar. De Castro made his pitch, saying that Chissano had played host to visits by Xanana Gusmao, the Timor Leste leader now living in exile in South Africa. When De Castro finally made his request, for Indonesia to provide weapons in the event of a war against a “regime that favors the secession of one of your provinces”, Ari was not impressed.

“But Frenamo is not the legitimate government of Mozambique, you going to war with the Mozambican Government means you’re just like the separatists we’ve faced throughout the years here in Indonesia and I don’t think President Try will approve”, replied Ari.

“We will be doing Indonesia a favor…” started De Castro.

“President Try will not approve”, insisted Ari “If he supports a rebellion in another country, that would just make governments around the world who support separatist movements in Indonesia feel that they are justified in their stance.”

“I respect that the President wants to have a clean fight against Indonesia’s enemies”, began De Castro “But know that Indonesia’s enemies would not have any problems with hitting below the waist.”

Away from the world’s eyes, in April 2002, Maputo, Mozambique played host to a secret conference attended by three men. Xanana Gusmao made the trip from South Africa where he was in exile to meet Chairman of the Timor Leste Government-in-Exile Jose Ramos Horta who made the long trip from New Zealand and Vice Chairman of the Timor Leste Government Mari Alkatiri who resided in Mozambique.

The three agreed that 2003 will be an important year in their struggle. Since 1999, the Armed Forces of the National Liberation of East Timor (FALINTIL) had gone dormant and accepted the “temporary state of affairs” of not conducting a rebellion against the Try Regime because of the Try Regime’s status as the lesser of two evils when compared to the Soeharto regime. After March 2003, regardless of who will be the President of Indonesia, the offensive against Indonesia must be resumed.

“If Try is re-elected, he would have vanquished the Soehartoists led by Tutut Soeharto and he would not be the lesser of two evils but the only evil left and we must renew our offensive”, argued Horta “If either Tutut or Megawati wins, then the current temporary state of affairs will come to an end and it will again be time for us to renew our offensive.”

Xanana and Alkatiri agreed. Xanana then spoke next saying that from Mozambique, he will be travelling to Tripoli, Libya where he will be paying Brotherly Leader and Guide of the Revolution of Libya Muammar Gaddafi a visit. Horta and Alkatiri perked up at this. They asked Xanana if he had any ideas about why Gaddafi wanted to meet him and what sort of assistance will be given to Timor Leste’s cause.

“At this stage, I have no ideas of what the specifics will be”, said Gusmao “Only that the OPM and GAM will also be there.”

---
Madagascar proved to be an unlikely place for a political crisis. It began with the 2001 Madagascarian Presidential Election due to be held in December 2001. Though there were six names on the ballot, only two was seen to matter: the incumbent President Didier Ratsiraka who, but a 4-year spell between 1993 and 1997, has governed Madagascar since 1975 and the popular Mayor of Antananarivo Marc Ravalomanana. When the count was completed by the government, Ravalomanana gained the most votes but not enough to win and a run-off was required. Ravalomanana claimed that he had won more than 50% of the votes and thus the presidency without there being a run-off required.

The situation in the country grew tense within the first few months of 2002. Ravalomanana called for a general strike to put pressure on the government to officially declare him the winner. Meanwhile, Ratsiraka set himself up in Toamasina, Madagascar’s second city; his loyalists either blockading or setting up roadblocks to the capital in a bid to prevent food and fuel from reaching the city. It was not long before the political crisis, and the political uncertainty brought along by it, caused an economic crisis.

Both Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana also looked outside the country for support in addition to positioning themselves domestically for victory. Ravalomanana sought support from the United States and the United Kingdom. In an interview in January 2002, Ravalomanana said that one of the items on his agenda as president will be to establish English as an official language alongside Malagasy and French. Ratsiraka on the other hand kept quiet but it was expected that he, having once adopted a pro-USSR policy, having once adopted a socialist economic policy, and having been nicknamed the Red Admiral, would turn to Moscow for assistance.

It would be France, however, that stepped up. French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Vedrine declared that France, which had been long time supporters of Ratsiraka, would not tolerate a “solution imposed by the party claiming itself to be in the majority”. Some days later, no less that President of France Jacques Chirac issued a statement on Madagascar when, in response to speculation that Ravalomanana was about to unilaterally declare himself the winner and have himself sworn in, that France would not recognize such a government.

Closer to Madagascar, the African nations also wanted to get involved with the OAU delegating to President of Senegal Abdoulaye Wade the task of mediating between Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana. Ravalomanana however was not contend to merely accept what was offered to him; pointing to Senegal’s similar stance to France (non-recognition of a unilaterally declared Ravalomanana victory and government), Ravalomanana called for more nations of a neutral stance to be involved and this was how South Africa’s Mbeki and Mozambique’s Chissano came to be involved.

Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, along with Wade, Mbeki, and Chissano as well as Vedrine who acted as an observer met in Dakar, Senegal in April 2002. Meeting in the shadows of Hugo Chavez’ overthrow in Venezuela, Ravalomanana quickly realized that he was surrounded by those who would not accept him unilaterally declaring victory and assuming power out of fear that it would look too much like Ratsiraka was being ousted. Ravalomanana said that he would not unilaterally declare victory and assume power, provided that Ratsiraka lift what was effectively a blockade on Antananarivo and a recount of the votes be conducted.

It was on the last point that the group had trouble deciding how to proceed. Ratsiraka disagreed on recounting the votes arguing that the next step in the process was a run-off election, something Wade was inclined to agree with. Mbeki tended to agree with Ravalomanana saying that before there can be a run-off, it did not hurt to determine whether or not a run-off is necessary through a recount though Ratsiraka responded with. Meanwhile, Chissano proposed fresh elections altogether to be monitored by France.

As the hours and days passed and as arguments and counter-arguments were made (Ratsiraka said he would not recognize the results of a recount), Chissano’s proposal began to gain momentum. Ravalomanana backed down and agreed to fresh elections. In the meantime, Ratsiraka would remain as president and Ravalomanana as mayor respectively. Ravalomanana also called once again for economic activity to be restored in Antananarivo and for the United Kingdom to monitor the election jointly with France. The conference agreed with Ravalomanana’s requests. The new election itself is set for September 2002 and British Foreign Secretary Gordon Brown expressed the United Kingdom’s readiness to provide assistance. Ratsiraka fulfilled the end of the bargain and by the end of April 2002, Antananarivo began to bustle again.

There was one nation that was not part of the negotiations but kept a close eye on development in Madagascar. An agreement signed with Ravalomanana in March 2001 had seen supermarkets and grocery stores in Antananarivo flooded by Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods by the year’s end. Anthony Salim, Indonesia’s minister of trade, and the man who had signed the agreement with Ravalomanana was using Madagascar as a trial run to see how decent range of Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods would do in an African market, the reasoning being that Madagascarians have similar tastes to Indonesians because the ancestors of Madagascarians emigrated from what is now Indonesia centuries ago. Anthony found a willing partner in Ravalomanana; both officials being businessmen who liked to see things happen quickly.

Anthony had been very satisfied with Ravalomanana’s commitment to encouraging Antananarivo-based distributors to take on Indonesian fast-moving consumer goods and was most unhappy that the political crisis had disrupted distribution in Antananarivo. He wanted to write an official complaint to Ratsiraka but had to be restrained by Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita. Ginandjar agreed that Indonesia’s best interests are served if Ravalomanana became president but said that Indonesia should not intervene in the affairs of other countries.

Mozambique’s Chissano had also sensed that Ravalomanana would also be good for Indonesia and that this would be dangerous for him. Increased trade between Indonesia and Madagascar would mean an increased Indonesian presence across the channel from Mozambique and it would mean more Indonesian eyes prying in Mozambique’s direction. Chissano sympathized with Timor Leste’s cause. And while he did not wish to know too much about what Gusmao, Horta, and Alkatiri was planning to maintain plausible deniability and though he did not know whether or not Indonesia knew they were having meetings in Mozambique, Chissano was clear that he did not want Indonesia sniffing around in his neighborhood. His involvement in the mediation between Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana was not that of a disinterested party.

Mauritius:
“I have two stories that come to mind when it comes to Indonesia and how it carries a certain amount of weight on the international stage.

From time to time, as part of the job, one gets courtesy calls from foreign officials who happened to be in the country at the moment and when I have the time, I would set aside some time to meet with them. My guest at that time, it would have been about August 2001, was your Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Tanto Kuswanto.

Minister Tanto said that he was in the country to visit the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IORA-ARC) which had its secretariat in Mauritius and that he would like to convey to me what he had conveyed to the IORA-ARC Secretariat: namely that Indonesia wanted the IORA-ARC to move beyond ministerial summits and perhaps have a summit attended by heads of government. I was impressed that he had done the legwork by lobbying other IORA-ARC members but argued that perhaps Indonesia would be better-placed to host the summit rather than Mauritius.

At this Minister Tanto demurred. He said that given that the secretariat was in Mauritius, perhaps Mauritus would want to host the first IORA-ARC Summit. A rather blunt man, Minister Tanto said that Indonesia’s interest was in getting the IORA-ARC members to recognize and abide by the three sea lanes of communication (SLOC) which has been approved by the International Maritime Organization’s Maritime Safety Committee in May 1998 at the summit. Minister Tanto said the Indonesian Government is hard at work to develop not only the related regulations but also the means to enforce said regulation. Beyond putting that on the agenda, Indonesia is willing to defer to Mauritius and other members.

For some months, the government gave it some thought and it was December 2001 when I contacted Minister Tanto. I told him Mauritius is willing to host the IORA-ARC Summit but that it would need Indonesia’s unconditional support. I said that it would be difficult to proceed with a maritime-related summit without the support of the world’s largest archipelagic nation. By the end of the month, Minister Tanto had procured a letter from President Try saying that Indonesia will render whatever support necessary for the successful holding of this summit and preparations were under way for the first IORA-ARC Summit.

The second story involved the Prevention of Terrorism Act which became law in early 2002. It was in the aftermath of 9/11 and Mauritius, not wanting similar things to occur in the country, began legislating a Prevention of Terrorism Bill. It was passed in February 2002 by the National Assembly but required the signature of the President of Mauritius for the bill to become law.

Therein lies the problem, because even though the President of Mauritius is a ceremonial position in our political system, the bill does not become law without his signature. Our president at the time was Cassam Uteem who is a Muslim and he said that some amendments needed to be made before he felt comfortable even considering signing it. He for example asked that the Office of the President be consulted before a court can declare individuals as terrorists. It was not only President Uteem who was worried. Muslims constitute 17% of the population in Mauritius and there was much concern that the new law would unfairly target Muslims.

I took these worries under considerations and when the bill was reintroduced to the National Assembly, amendments were introduced including the one requested by President Uteem. In my speech marking the passing of the bill for a second time, I expressed my strongest hope that this bill would become law. I told the nation that the War on Terror, both the one conducted internationally and the one to be prevented domestically in Mauritius, will not target Muslims. After all, I argued, one of the nations that is most serious about combatting terrorism and religious extremism in the current time is none other than Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation. When it arrived at his desk, President Uteem signed the Prevention of Terrorism Bill into law.”

Excerpt from Speech given by former Prime Minister of Mauritius Anerood Jugnauth on the occasion of the 40th Anniversary of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta, 1st October 2011

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I didn’t think Indonesia would be so prominent in this update but there you go.

I learn something new when I write these updates. One thing that I never realized was that Nelson Mandela invaded and occupied Lesotho.

OTL Chissano was given East Timor’s highest civilian award for his contribution towards East Timor independence. https://clubofmozambique.com/news/f...awarded-highest-honour-east-timor-mozambique/

France does not assert itself in Madagascar's political crisis in OTL, instead it took its time recognizing OTL Ravalomanana as president when the election recount fell in Ravalomanana's favor. What I wanted to convey here is France being more assertive because of the ITTL world being more multipolar. South Africa seeing itself as being Africa's "pole" in a multipolar world is a manifestation of this world being more multipolar.

The only African nation that mediated Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana in both OTL and ITTL is Senegal. The presence of South Africa (because it wants to see itself as a regional leader) and Mozambique (because it has its own reasoning about a pro-Indonesian Madagascarian President).

OTL IORA held its first summit in Indonesia in 2017.

Through Mauritius’s POV, I want to convey the “weight” that Indonesia has even though it’s not a superpower or a great power.

On the Indonesia as a maritime nation front, the argument is that it wouldn’t be right to have a maritime issues summit if the largest archipelagic nation was not on board.

On the Indonesia as the largest Muslim nation front, the argument is that the War on Terror could not be seen as a campaign against Islam when the world’s largest Muslim nation is fighting it as well and fighting it seriously.

 

[GSD310]

Favourite moments for me would be when Try supporters threw their membership card in front of Tutut, restoration of order in Timor and Maluku(get rekt subversive elements), and military reform/expansion stuff(though disagree on how much the army is expanding but yeah probably because the army's ego on how they don't wanna be outnumbered by the police+Dwifungsi is in place so the army can be used to be a policing force). As for favourite people other than the obvious one like Edi Sudradjat, our beloved duo head of state+government, and from the opposition Akbar Tanjung. I would probably say Soegiarto(I'm still dendam kesumat about how died).

On Agus Wirahadikusumah, yeah in no way he can do his radical reforms in the armed forces, i just wanna see how far he can go for his reforms in this TL for the president would probably support some if not most of his professionalisation reform and calm him down on others(uncovering past corruption) considering he need a "clean" army if he wanna go against China. Probably head of a powerful ABRI Training Command in a way that Wiranto's clique can control the present but for the sake of Indonesia, the reformist will control the future. But that's just my headcannon, probably too optimistic 🤤.

The military reform will always be a case of some things will change but 1) Don't touch Dual Function and 2)The Army is still number one. But by New Order standards, expanding the Navy, Air Force, and Police would already be a big deal.

We're on the same wavelength here on the direction ABRI is going: part of improving military capability is to become more professional so there will be a place for Agus' ideas. An advantage that ITTL Agus would have over his OTL version is that he's not resented by his fellow officers so his ideas are safe.

In terms of military factions, you are correct that there is a Wiranto Faction (Members include: Wiranto, Djaja Suparman, and Djamari Chaniago). I'm not sure that there is a clear reformist faction as such just guys that were close to Agus.

Probably the other real factions in ABRI or the Army are:

-The Palace Favorites (Members include: TB Hasanuddin, Srijanto, Ryamizard Ryacudu). TB Hasanuddin was Try's aide-de-camp when he was VP. Srijanto, also spelled Sriyanto, was the officer on the ground at Tanjung Priok in 1984. Ryamizard was and is Try's son-in-law though if you notice, ITTL Ryamizard is nowhere near as powerful as Prabowo even though he's the President's son-in-law.

-The Yudhoyono Faction (Members include: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Djoko Santoso, Pramono Edhie). I didn't really planned it but it just worked out that way but ITTL SBY missed out on being Army Chief Staff twice (In 2000, he lost out to Luhut. In early 2002, he lost out to TB Hasanuddin). Does he become sakit hati about it? We will see.

It's always fun writing Try and Edi. It was either going to be Edi or Harsudiono Hartas as the State Secretary. But then when I did my research, I found Harsudiono was a prime candidate for minister of home affairs before he went ahead and nominated Try as VP without Soeharto's permission in 1993 so being Minister of Home Affairs was where he went and Edi became State Secretary. It fit well because when Try was Army Chief of Staff in OTL, Edi was the Deputy Army Chief of Staff so it's a renewed partnership.

Soegiarto's OTL significance, in addition to being Minister of Transmigration between 1988-1993, is that he and Try were the first of the post-1945 generation of officers who got the rank of brigadier general. So him being around is a signal that the post-1945 generations are going to get their real shot at governing. He died quiet violently ITTL so that when the alarm bell is rung for Try regarding the Extreme Right, it is rung quite loudly.

Akbar Tanjung is an important piece of the political puzzle to have. Long-time readers will remember that it was because Akbar threw his support behind Tutut at the 1998 Golkar National Congress that Tutut had a decisive victory and became the Chairwoman of Golkar. Not as successful as his OTL version, who was already Chairman of DPR by this stage, but no less of a calculating politician.

 

[Pio2013]

I feel Mauritius its going to play a bigger role asserting Indonesia as a main reference for Africa.