What if the Anti-Party group had succeeded in overthrowing Khrushchev?

[gaitskellitebevanite]

What if the Anti-Party group had succeeded in overthrowing Khrushchev in June 1957? It seems as though every book I read on the subject takes a different view to who the main leader of the coup was (some say Molotov, others Malenkov, one even suggested Kaganovich) and who would take over the vital post of First Secretary of the CPSU. Some sources suggest they sought to elect Bulganin as First Secretary with Malenkov succeeding Khrushchev as Premier and Khrushchev being demoted to Agriculture Minister, but other sources suggest Molotov would have taken over as First Secretary. Does anyone have any more information on what the coups aim in terms of taking over political positions was?

The plotters themselves were an unlikely band of old style Stalinists - Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov - and younger figures more open to reform - Malenkov and Shepilov. They were only united in their dislike of Khrushchev's centralisation of power (and decentralisation of power to regional party leaders at the expense of the Politburo). Surely had the coup succeeded there would have been some form of conflict within the new leadership between the Malenkov faction and the Molotov-Kaganovich faction, who would have won out?

 

[gaitskellitebevanite]

Any takers?

 

[Gukpard]

@fasquardon what do you think?

 

[Seandineen]

Its possible without Zhokov to come to the rescuse. Would Malkenov have has religious conversion sooner perhaps? He might propose a Austrian style democratic neutralism for Germany, and try to reconcile with Yugoslavia without the cockeyed agricultural policy and a little subtly in Poland, in the aftermath of the blood spilling in Hungary.

 

[Cudymcar]

"Anti-Party Group" is a term coined by the state propaganda. Those demoted weren't a group, there was hardly any plot.
In case of their victory, well, Malenkov's program was much more liberal than later proposed Kosygin's reforms.

 

[Seandineen]

I am hopeful, a descalation of the Cold war, need not require Nikita's bi polar enthusiasms.

 

[David T]

I would say that the "Anti-Party Group" consisted of several different tendencies:

(1) Molotov and Kaganovich, old-fashioned "Stalinists" worried about the effects of the 20th Party Congress on morale and who wanted to change things as little as possible from the Stalin era. Robert Conquest (whose Power and Policy in the USSR is my main source for this post) once defined Molotov's program as "no adventures and no concessions." Yet even Molotov and Kaganovich did not agree on everything--Molotov alone was singled out for condemnation for having opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Yugoslavia.

(2) Malenkov, who shared their concerns about the 20th Party Congress, at least to the extent that the investigation into Stalin-era crimes might implicate him to a great degree (especially with respect to the Leningrad affair) yet who was not really a hard-liner on policy changes (indeed, as Prime Minister he had urged greater attention to consumer goods, had supported the "new course" in eastern Europe, and seemed more open to German unification than Khrushchev was).

(3) Voroshilov, who had to be concerned that the rehabilitation of purged military men would implicate him for his own role in the military purges.

(4) Pervukhin and Saburov--economic managers who were unhappy about Khrushchev's economic reorganization (to some extent they were both associated with Malenkov who also had "managerial" views) which increased Party power over industry at the expense of the State economic machinery.

(5) Bulganin, who may have had reservations about the 20th Party Congress but who insisted that he did not object to any of the Party's post-1953 policies--not the Virgin Lands, not even the reorganization of industry. As Robert Conquest observed in Power and Policy in the USSR, Bulganin's insistence on this amounts to saying "Even those who agree with Khrushchev on policy find him intolerable as a ruler"...

(6) Shepilov "who joined them." In his memoirs, he tries to dispel the accusation that he was a former Khrushchev ally who had gone over to the opposition for opportunistic reasons, yet does not deny that he voted for a lot of the policies he later condemned. Like some other members of the Group, he may have been sincerely concerned that such initiatives as the Virgin Lands and the economic restructuring and the "grow maize" campaigns were insufficiently thought-out--"hare-brained schemes" as Khrushchev's enemies called them on his downfall. Shepilov did not seem to oppose a certain degree of cultural liberalization (if it didn't go "too far") and actually helped write parts of the "Secret Speech."

Basically, all that united the "Group" was the idea that Khrushchev was an unprincipled adventurer. As Kuzmin put it at the 21st Party Congress:

"The anti - party group - Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Bulganin and Shepilov — accused our Party's Central Committee and also Comrade N . S . Khrushchev of practicism and of being too engulfed in the practical tasks of economic construction. As is known , such accusations were also raised by the Yugoslav revisionists..."

As Conquest noted in Power and Policy in the USSR, "If the 'Yugoslav revisionists' could agree with Molotov on this issue, it to some extent accounts for the reconciling of Shepilov and Molotov, and of Malenkov and Kaganovich, who had hitherto held opposite views on most major issues."

In any event, it is pretty clear that Khrushchev's attempt to portray all opposition to his views by later members of the "Group" over the past several years as "Group" activity was false. If they came together as a group, it was only in June 1957 and only for one purpose--to replace the allegedly erratic and adventurist Khrushchev with a less objectionable First Secretary. Had they succeeded in doing so, it seems unlikely they could have maintained unity.

 

[fasquardon]

I've yet to read into this episode specifically. But from what I know of the personalities involved... Well. The one name on this list who might bring the USSR closest to a second Stalinist era is Molotov, who thought that Stalin screwed up by not collectivizing hard enough (he wanted to make everything state farms and eliminate the collective farms) and thought more purges would be a good idea, but Molotov wasn't Stalin. He had his own quirks and good points that would make him a very different leader to Stalin. And I can't see him undoing all of the changes made since 1953...

So the rest of the group, who were closer to Khrushchev in the substance of their positions are even less Stalin-esque. Calling them "old Stalinists" is fair enough, but Khrushchev himself was an old Stalinist as was anyone else of any importance in the Soviet Union in this period.

Besides "closer to conservative Khrushchev than next gen Stalin", I'm not really sure what the next regime would look like if the group succeeded. I have no idea who even has the best chance of securing power if Khrushchev is taken down.

fasquardon

 

[raharris1973]

Would Malkenov have has religious conversion sooner perhaps?

Malenkov had some kind of religious conversion? Please explain. I doubt a profession of faith would be *good* for his political prospects in the USSR.

He might propose a Austrian style democratic neutralism for Germany

and seemed more open to German unification than Khrushchev was

Well that would be interesting.

I've yet to read into this episode specifically. But from what I know of the personalities involved... Well. The one name on this list who might bring the USSR closest to a second Stalinist era is Molotov, who thought that Stalin screwed up by not collectivizing hard enough (he wanted to make everything state farms and eliminate the collective farms)

Could Molotov's hardline against concessions and enthusiasm for state farms/communes make him more simpatico with Mao on policy and ideology grounds, and prevent the Sino-Soviet split?

and try to reconcile with Yugoslavia

That's a cool idea. But hadn't Khrushchev already reconciled with Yugoslavia?

 

[Seandineen]

Tito and Khrushchev sort of bounced around the desire for socialist unity, if only as a bulwark against china. Malenkov turned to the Orthodox church while exiled in Mongolia, ittl i was wondering if he might turn into MS thirty years earlier?

 

[fasquardon]

Could Molotov's hardline against concessions and enthusiasm for state farms/communes make him more simpatico with Mao on policy and ideology grounds, and prevent the Sino-Soviet split?

I suspect that Molotov would get on better with Mao, but any ideological congruence would be a small part of that.

Molotov's advantages towards China come from him actually having some experience at diplomacy and the world outside the USSR - not much experience sure, but a heck of alot more than most people in the Soviet upper ranks had - and from his faithfulness to Stalin (I can see the Soviets under Molotov admitting that some things that happened under Stalin weren't great, but for sure all the school books are going to lionize Stalin like US schoolbooks lionize George Washington, and since Mao sees himself as China's Stalin, he will like that). I don't know if Mao would see Molotov as a strong leader - I suspect he would, but that's not a given. Khrushchev's aura of buffoonery helped him survive and secure power inside the Soviet Union, but when dealing with people abroad, it didn't play well and it REALLY didn't play well with Mao. So Molotov not being Khrushchev will help him there, and Molotov was certainly a strong personality and one who didn't pad his sharp edges in the way Khrushchev did, so the potential is there.

But chemistry between people is often fickle, so it could go either way really.

And as far as policies - what the Chinese wanted (IMO deservedly so) was mainly to be treated with respect and to have their real practical problems addressed. When the CCP won the Chinese civil war, the Soviets were in a race against time to get over their racism and colonialist habits before the Chinese ran out of tolerance - in OTL, the Soviets didn't manage it. The Chinese also wanted Soviet help with their economy and military (which in OTL they largely got - Soviet aid to China after 1949 constitutes the largest technology transfer in human history even though the Soviets said no to a few things) and for the Soviets to address the disputed areas of the Sino-Soviet border as equals, rather than continuing to be as intransigent as Tsarist Russia. Oh, and the Chinese wanted the Soviets to treat them as masters of their own house. The Soviets had broken off most of Mongolia from China and tried to break off Sinkiang from China during the warlord period - with such a history people in Moscow saying what people in China ought to do and how they ought to go about working towards socialism wasn't the sort of thing that was ever going to play well in Beijing.

Maybe Molotov could move on these practical concerns faster due to his diplomatic experience, maybe he wouldn't have the mental flexibility and would continue thinking China was the mess of the 1930s and 1940s until he is smacked in the face by a full on boarder war as Brezhnev was. Maybe Molotov would have worse relations with the west, forcing him to be more considerate and generous to his Chinese allies. Or maybe Molotov's likely conservative (well, conservative compared to Khrushchev) foreign policy and WW2 experience of working with the WAllies would lead to a sort of slow, cautious detente that would enrage the more radical Mao. Maybe Molotov's "Old Bolshevik" cred (he had joined the party much earlier than Khrushchev) will lessen Mao's insistence on being seen as the senior leader in world socialism. Or maybe Mao will still insist that Molotov treats him with deference, Molotov will be too blunt in his reply, and the split is even worse than OTL.

So all in all, I think congruent policy is the icing to a much larger cake. Congruent policy alone wouldn't save Sino-Soviet relations from going down the tubes, and I can imagine the Soviets and Chinese going in very different directions policy-wise, but still remaining close, if fractious, allies.

I DO think that even in the best case scenario, the Sino-Soviet relationship will be a delicate and spikey one. Especially during Mao's day, the two great empires will not find it easy to be friends. But I do think it is possible to avoid a complete breach as occurred in OTL.

fasquardon

 

[Mad Bad Rabbit]

Kruschev personally supported Lysenko, so making him Agriculture Minister might result in a very hungry 1960s.

 

[raharris1973]

I suspect that Molotov would get on better with Mao, but any ideological congruence would be a small part of that.

Molotov's advantages towards China come from him actually having some experience at diplomacy and the world outside the USSR - not much experience sure, but a heck of alot more than most people in the Soviet upper ranks had - and from his faithfulness to Stalin (I can see the Soviets under Molotov admitting that some things that happened under Stalin weren't great, but for sure all the school books are going to lionize Stalin like US schoolbooks lionize George Washington, and since Mao sees himself as China's Stalin, he will like that). I don't know if Mao would see Molotov as a strong leader - I suspect he would, but that's not a given. Khrushchev's aura of buffoonery helped him survive and secure power inside the Soviet Union, but when dealing with people abroad, it didn't play well and it REALLY didn't play well with Mao. So Molotov not being Khrushchev will help him there, and Molotov was certainly a strong personality and one who didn't pad his sharp edges in the way Khrushchev did, so the potential is there.

But chemistry between people is often fickle, so it could go either way really.

And as far as policies - what the Chinese wanted (IMO deservedly so) was mainly to be treated with respect and to have their real practical problems addressed. When the CCP won the Chinese civil war, the Soviets were in a race against time to get over their racism and colonialist habits before the Chinese ran out of tolerance - in OTL, the Soviets didn't manage it. The Chinese also wanted Soviet help with their economy and military (which in OTL they largely got - Soviet aid to China after 1949 constitutes the largest technology transfer in human history even though the Soviets said no to a few things) and for the Soviets to address the disputed areas of the Sino-Soviet border as equals, rather than continuing to be as intransigent as Tsarist Russia. Oh, and the Chinese wanted the Soviets to treat them as masters of their own house. The Soviets had broken off most of Mongolia from China and tried to break off Sinkiang from China during the warlord period - with such a history people in Moscow saying what people in China ought to do and how they ought to go about working towards socialism wasn't the sort of thing that was ever going to play well in Beijing.

Maybe Molotov could move on these practical concerns faster due to his diplomatic experience, maybe he wouldn't have the mental flexibility and would continue thinking China was the mess of the 1930s and 1940s until he is smacked in the face by a full on boarder war as Brezhnev was. Maybe Molotov would have worse relations with the west, forcing him to be more considerate and generous to his Chinese allies. Or maybe Molotov's likely conservative (well, conservative compared to Khrushchev) foreign policy and WW2 experience of working with the WAllies would lead to a sort of slow, cautious detente that would enrage the more radical Mao. Maybe Molotov's "Old Bolshevik" cred (he had joined the party much earlier than Khrushchev) will lessen Mao's insistence on being seen as the senior leader in world socialism. Or maybe Mao will still insist that Molotov treats him with deference, Molotov will be too blunt in his reply, and the split is even worse than OTL.

So all in all, I think congruent policy is the icing to a much larger cake. Congruent policy alone wouldn't save Sino-Soviet relations from going down the tubes, and I can imagine the Soviets and Chinese going in very different directions policy-wise, but still remaining close, if fractious, allies.

I DO think that even in the best case scenario, the Sino-Soviet relationship will be a delicate and spikey one. Especially during Mao's day, the two great empires will not find it easy to be friends. But I do think it is possible to avoid a complete breach as occurred in OTL.

fasquardon

Newly "standing up" countries have a habit of giving their allies almost as nasty bites as their enemies. The new PRC spent its initial vitriol on the USA, but started turning it on the USSR after about a decade of existence. The Egyptian Free Officers spent their vitriol at first on Britain, and by extension America, and Israel, but within 20 years were screwing the USSR.

The best way to not get bit by a new nationalist country is to be *neither* its enemy nor its *ally*. The best position is to be out of its sight and out of its mind.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

The best way to not get bit by a new nationalist country is to be *neither* its enemy nor its *ally*. The best position is to be out of its sight and out of its mind.

That strikes me as rather hard when the two countries in question are Russia (in any of it's incarnations since the 1700s) and China. The two are simply too big, too powerful, and too close (in a number of different meanings of that term) to be out of each others sight and mind.

 

[fasquardon]

Newly "standing up" countries have a habit of giving their allies almost as nasty bites as their enemies. The new PRC spent its initial vitriol on the USA, but started turning it on the USSR after about a decade of existence. The Egyptian Free Officers spent their vitriol at first on Britain, and by extension America, and Israel, but within 20 years were screwing the USSR.

The best way to not get bit by a new nationalist country is to be *neither* its enemy nor its *ally*. The best position is to be out of its sight and out of its mind.

Maybe? Though I think it is important to note that a big part of why those who get too close to newly-standing-up countries get bit is because they have been behaving badly.

The Egyptians of all political stripes had excellent reasons to consider the British their enemies - like the 20ish years of Britain trying everything it could to wriggle out of treaties they'd signed back in the 30s and continue treating Egypt as a colony. And while the Soviets treated China better than the Brits treated Egypt, there is enough colonialist backstabbery (landing China with most of the bill for the Korean war, for example) that I think the Chinese were well within their rights to bite the Soviets when they failed to smarten up fast enough.

I don't think you can fit the Soviet-Egyptian and Egyptian-Israeli ructions into the same paradigm of "smacking colonialist stupidity", but there were rational (if not always good) reasons for why Israeli-Egyptian and Soviet-Egyptian relations played out the way they did. By which I mean, if you accept the logic of nationalism and accept the idea that Egypt is an Arab country, it is understandable why Nasser and his cohorts saw Israel as an enemy. And once it became clear that Soviet aid wasn't going to bring victory against Israel and that the US was willing to outbid the Soviets for Egyptian friendship AND could help Egypt reach some kind of detente with Israel, it's pretty easy to see why the Egyptians would ditch the Soviets fast in the 70s.

However good or bad the reasoning, Egypt wasn't acting like a rabid dog. And nor, I think, was China. Though Mao certainly behaved like a cult leader high on his own cool aid, he wasn't the only person making decisions in China. Indeed, Deng Xioping would be an important figure in the story Sino-Soviet hostility before and after the Cultural Revolution, since he was involved in the early talks with the Soviets after the CCP won the civil war and never forgot just how up their own rear ends his Soviet counterparts were... It took the radical changes under Gorbachev to convince him that it was worth trying to seriously engage with the Soviets again.

fasquardon

 

[Seandineen]

What became of lin biao? His desire for Marxist unity might gain a hearing in this blood encrusted world.