Phrynichus' withdrawal: in 412 BC, the Athenians had shifted their focus to reducing Miletus. They and their allies managed to win the Miletians and other forces near the city and they were on the grasp of taking the city, when Phrynichus, citing reports of an approaching larger fleet, convinced his fellow commanders to withdraw and avoid battle, thus allowing the Spartans to retain control of the city's port, and incidentally costing the city the support of the Argives, who essentially withdrew from the war after that event; the Peloponnesian fleet avoided capture, the Chians were freed from the threat of Athenian operations, and soon afterwards, the Athenias lost almost the entire coast of Asia Minor and Rhodes.
In general, the Athenians had been able to defeat most Spartan fleets in the Aegean and contain the uprisings of their tributaries for the most part thus far. Miletus was the main rebel city in Asia Minor and the site most eligible for a Spartan land base which could allow them to conduct operations in Ionia and refuse battle to the Athenians whenever necessary. Despite the defeat in Sicily, the Athenians still retained a tactical and psychological advantage over their enemies, as shown by their successes earlier that year (the bottling up of a Peloponnesian fleet in Corinthian waters, at least one battle where the Athenian fleet was numerically inferior to the Spartan one etc) - this was also seen by the fact that the Spartans generally avoided naval confrontations with the Athenians whenever possible in 412 and 411 BC. Furthermore, after Syracuse, the Athenians would most likely have to settle for more "pitched" naval battles, where they would have to lure the enemy by presenting inferior numbers; as such, a victory for the Athenians was quite likely.
In general, the Athenians had been able to defeat most Spartan fleets in the Aegean and contain the uprisings of their tributaries for the most part thus far. Miletus was the main rebel city in Asia Minor and the site most eligible for a Spartan land base which could allow them to conduct operations in Ionia and refuse battle to the Athenians whenever necessary. Despite the defeat in Sicily, the Athenians still retained a tactical and psychological advantage over their enemies, as shown by their successes earlier that year (the bottling up of a Peloponnesian fleet in Corinthian waters, at least one battle where the Athenian fleet was numerically inferior to the Spartan one etc) - this was also seen by the fact that the Spartans generally avoided naval confrontations with the Athenians whenever possible in 412 and 411 BC. Furthermore, after Syracuse, the Athenians would most likely have to settle for more "pitched" naval battles, where they would have to lure the enemy by presenting inferior numbers; as such, a victory for the Athenians was quite likely.
